# 1NC – NDT Round the First – Emory PR

## 1

### 1NC – Kritik

#### The AFF’s promise of progress through the expansion of core anti-trust law understands the world in terms of visible and fixable exchanges between subjects. This process misses the black hole of antiblack violence that undergirds all political and social arrangements of modernity.

**Mubirumusoke 21** [Mukasa Mubirumusoke, Assistant Professor of Africana Studies, October 16, 2021, Philosophy Today, “Prolegomena to any Future Cosmology”, Pages 6-11, JMH]

Similar to white supremacy, black holes may be confirmed to exist but, ultimately, they remain much of a mystery. Despite the excitement and wonderment recent images invoked, black holes do not fit seamlessly into the modern imagination of the cosmos: they are a scandal. Black people know all too well that visual evidence can hardly be considered definitive incontrovertible proof or understanding. The point of analogy that I want to begin with is that over against Bataille’s sun as the extra-metaphysical signifier of the excesses of meaning, profanity, unraveled hierarchies, and the possibility of intimacy between humans, over against the individuation of reasoning, is this: the black hole as anti-black white supremacy, while having cosmic effects on its surroundings, remains invisible and this invisibility is reproduced by Bataille’s inability to distinguish chattel slavery and its aftermath as a metaphysical foundation of modernity from other forms of slavery, oppression, and exploitation. The images of a black hole, just like images and statistics of violence against blacks, distract from a shared fundamental quality, namely that by nature they fundamentally cannot be perceived directly.8 The structural invisibility of the interiority of a black hole, as opposed to the possible effects it may render visible through its interactions with phenomena around it, is the first characteristic to consider in a prolegomena to a new cosmology. Frank Wilderson continually reiterates as a core argument of afropessimism the structural antagonism of white supremacy and blackness as opposed to a contingent relation that may be resolved through some form of reconciliation. The visual manifestations of antiblack racism are similar to the ring of light that indicates the presence of a black hole, but the core of white supremacy refuses to be seen. **The antagonism renders the uniqueness of antiblack racism illegible since we are compelled to speak of it with the same vocabulary as any other form of oppression, alienation, and violence even though the structural grammar of anti-blackness entails that blackness, or the positionality of “the Slave,” exists as a “socially dead” antagonist in opposition to the human**. A person is conceptualizing in the wrong register if they think any phenomenal events in themselves will get to white supremacy’s essence since its essence lies not in the individual or collective acts, but in the repetitive conceptual labor that the gratuitous violence against black people achieves for the social cohesion of white civil society. This is the invisible core of white supremacy beyond the event horizon. In their essay, “The Avant-Garde of White Supremacy,” Jared Sexton and Steve Martinot articulate a clearer context for the structural invisibility of antiblack violence through the dimension of the extra-ordinary. Beginning with the case of Amadou Diallo, Sexton and Martinot want to explain why police violence appears so frequently and moreover why calling attention to this violence does not seem to help, but, rather, it only seems to strengthen the policing paradigm. To explain this non-intuitive phenomenon, they argue that police violence against black people is not just the response of police officers to law breaking. The police literally create the law with these violent acts, that is to say, police violence against black people is not a response to any action of violation done by black actors per se, but, instead, is an initiating ritual of reifying blackness criminally through a self-substantiating legislative act and executive order that belongs to the structural grammar, or cosmological order, of white supremacy. Moreover, the spectacle of police violence as seen or reported through the news draws attention away from the extra-ordinary, mundane, devastation of black people that is the effect of the police’s legislative/executive power not merely as random spectacle of violence (at the event horizon), but more importantly as a necessarily mundane communal labor for white civil society. They explain: The spectacular event camouflages the operation of police law as contempt, as terror, its occupation of neighborhoods; the secret of police law is the fact that there is no recourse to the disruption of people’s lives by these activities. In fact, the focus on the spectacular event of police violence is to deploy (and thereby reaffirm) the logic of police profiling itself. . . . Examples cannot represent the spectrum of contemporary white supremacy from the subtle . . . to the extreme . . . all of which has becomes structural and everyday. . . . Most theories of white supremacy seek to plumb the depths of its excessiveness, beyond the ordinary; they miss the fact that racism is a mundane affair. (Sexton and Martinot 2003: 173) White supremacy and antiblackness as constituted through terror and contempt, but also as “ordinary,” “mundane,” or extra-ordinary, is the other dimension of the invisible black hole of white supremacy that is set adjacent to the excessive sun of human intimacy. Invisibly orientating Bataille’s sun is the gravitational pull of the black hole. The black hole of white supremacy has extraordinary power that is terrifying since it cannot be seen as such, but it is also said that a black hole is at the center of every galaxy, thus in some way is ordinary and constitutive. Furthermore, the black hole of white supremacy that gives spectacular glimmers at its event horizon is at its core, contentless, mundane, and also without reason. Martinot and Sexton explain, “White supremacy is nothing more than what we perceive of it; there is nothing beneath it nor outside it to give it justification. The structure of its banality is the surface on which it operates. The mythic content it pretends to claim is a priori empty. . . . In other words, its truth lies in the rituals that sustain its circuitous, contentless logic; it is, in fact, nothing but its very practices” (Sexton and Martinot 2003: 175). There is no absolute content to white supremacy’s authoritative position, only the brute assertion of the fact and, therefore, there is nothing really to be discerned except the gratuitous—as opposed to contingent—violence of its actions and the effects it has on black people. **The white supremacist black hole’s illogic is therefore a more sinister parody than Bataille’s illogical “Solar Anus” since the former affects black lives in a way that totally trivializes the profundity of the latter’s transgressive intervention even though both are founded in a disavowal of reason.**9 The communal function that white supremacy’s violence performs is not to shock through the spectacular—as one may be inclined to read Bataille’s “Solar Anus”—but to support the affective coherence of white civil society by providing a negation upon which to secure non-black identity through libidinal fortification in the more mundane execution of violence against black life. Antiblack violence that positions black people in the position of “the Slave” is the real labor at work. Or as Wilderson explains, “the slave is . . . an anti-Human, a position against which humanity establishes, maintains, and renews its coherence, its corporeal integrity” (Wilderson 2010: 11). The fact that the duality of the spectacular and the mundane map well onto Bataille’s cosmological picture is not coincidental; Sexton and Martinot articulate the operations of white supremacy through a dual economy as well. Just as Bataille’s restricted economy functions through reason on earth and ultimately yields to the excessive general economy of the sun, in the proposed expanded cosmology of this essay the black hole has a dual structure where there is a spectacular economy at the event horizon of rationalized violence that ultimately yields to an excessive hyper economy of banality and irrationality. Sexton and Martinot describe their dual economy as such: The black hole of white supremacy is surrounded by a policing—which is not restricted to the actual police, but to a disposition of policing blackness—event horizon that distorts reality, but which appears spectacular from the human perspective. The hyper-economy of injustice is from where white supremacy excretes its irrational aura to justify its own self-conception and thus also allow for its everyday reality and ritualistic spectacular displays of violence in front of the mundane. The spectacular economy of police violence is the restricted economy of rational individuation where one sees black being as abject along the event horizon; whereas the banal mundane hyper injustice is the over rich center and together these economies make the invisible extra-ordinary black hole of white supremacy. V. Conclusion: To a New Cosmology The sun is also a night. In Bataille’s cosmologies he mistakes the solar system for the cosmos. In fact, there is another sun, the black hole, a scandal by no other name (Wilderson 2007: 23–35). The black hole of white supremacy is at the middle of the milky way of white civil society, which, while seemingly far away, still keeps the entire structure of white civil society afloat; it keeps Bataille’s generous sun in orbit. In this broader cosmology, where white supremacy is truly interrogated, black social—or perhaps more accurately political—death is a cosmological certainty, as the policing event horizon approaches and only x-rays escape the black hole’s gravitational pull. Over the centuries since the institution of chattel slavery and the absolute degradation of blacks, we have seen the idea of what or who constitute the human change and yet blacks retain their antagonistic positionality. In the future this may continue, or maybe humans even leave earth for other planets, but until the black hole of white supremacy is addressed, things may change, but antiblackness will remain the same. **Unless, of course, it doesn’t, because it never was the same. It’s hard to imagine that “social death” is all there is to black life—and it should be noted neither Wilderson nor Sexton ever make such a claim and acknowledge that indeed black people are more than the living dead.** With that said, in the name of something referred to as black social life, Fred Moten gives special attention to the possibilities intertwined in the impossibility of social death. In fact, **he argues the term “social death” is more properly understood as a political death,** writing: [W]hat I am trying to get to, by way of this terminological slide [of social and political death] in [Orlando] Patterson, is the consideration of a radical disjunction between sociality and the state-sanction, state sponsored error of power-laden intersubjectivity. . . . I am in total agreement with the Afro-pessimistic understanding of Blackness as exterior to civil society and, moreover, as unmappable within the cosmological grid of the transcendental subject. However, I **understand civil society and the coordinates of the transcendental aesthetic . . . to be the fundamentally and essential antisocial nursery for a necessarily necro-political imitation of life. (Moten 2013: 740).** If we leave behind “the cosmological grid of the transcendental subject”—which Bataille attempts, but, nevertheless, stays tethered to in his analyses by occluding the operations of white supremacy—what else do the stars leave us? **We must not forget that a black hole, in light of its mystery and physics of destruction, also permits the possibility of something beyond its scandalous core, whole other criminal dimensions.** Well if we follow Moten, along with Houston Baker Jr., but also Michelle Wallace, who suggests new cosmological dimensions that exemplify the capacities of black feminine creativity,10 then perhaps we can catch a fugitive glimpse, as this is only the prolegomena to any new cosmology.

#### Sovereignty and state power are maintained through the extermination of the excess of blackness. Rather than endorsing their investment in the 1AC’s capitalist project, you should use this as an opportunity to embrace the excess of the black hole of racial terror.

**Martin and Harney 07** [Randy and Stefano “Mode of Excess. Bataille, criminality and the war on terror.” Theory and Event (10: 2, 2007), JMH]

Capital's Excesses Bataille's vision bathes us all in the lap of luxury. So much of the political is cast in terms of lack-an insufficiency of activism, organization, theory, or resources to mobilize, in the face of an abundance of ossifying power. Excess refreshes the screen, it releases people from the enclosures of scarcity and the insuperable inevitability of aggression that springs from want. The compulsion to dominate is denormalized and exposed for its own peculiar excessiveness The dull efficiency of utilitarian accounting-where every drop is used best when used up and growth marches inexorably forward-loses its reason in desire's hall of mirrors. Understandably, Bataille's work is taken up as a cry for amplitude in a wilderness of self-limiting apocalypse. Entangling his thought in the present requires more than the lavishing of praise. He achieves his general economy by energic extension and squander that yields irrecuperable consumption. But his analysis proceeds by differentiating the ways in which societies attain their forms of surplus. These various means constitute nothing short of a mode of excess-a concept that can help extricate ourselves from Bataille's moment into that of contemporary affairs. If Bataille renders an ethnological or synchronic differentiation in his accounts of the Aztecs, Potlatch, Islam, Lamaism, bourgeois capitalism and Soviet socialism, we might look to his work of the middle of the last century to delineate the contours of excess in our own times. Let us consider three elements of what might constitute Bataille's own mode of excess, writing as he is, when consumer capitalism and Soviet socialism retain their status as historical projects, and war adheres snugly to a Keynesian metaphysic. Bataille, of course is writing under the sign of what came to be called Fordism, a regulatory apparatus that mass produced consumption as a disciplinary realm parallel to but outside that of production. While the externality was mutual, it was also directional-domesticity was the sphere were cars and people started out new and became old, where time was free, leisure expressed substantive rationality, and used luxuries could be put out in the garbage. Despite, or perhaps more precisely because of the way in which the Keynesian welfare state was involved in the economy, subventions for public assistance and military contracting stood as anti-productive. In the dream realm of popular culture and consumer markets, of manufactured desires, the state needed to be absent to locate excess in a space that would be free of coercion and domination-hence the formal distinction from work and government. The state operates for Bataille in a universe of general interest that can never use up the erotic extensive energies of the accursed share. "The State (at least the modern, fully developed State) cannot give full reign to a movement of destructive consumption without which an indefinite accumulation of resources situates us in the universe in exactly the same way as cancer is inscribed in the body, as a negation. " (Bataille 1993: 160) War is the consummate category of expenditure that can be stolen back by state and particularizing economic exchange, especially as it seeks an equilibrium between destruction and profit in what is intended as a virtuous cycle of demand absorbing supply that Franklin Delano Roosevelt dubbed, "Dr. Win The War." Like the partition between production and consumption, this political economy of war assumes that death and profitability belong to separate accounts, and that civic devastation will be restored by a reincorporating policy framework like the Marshall Plan. As Bataille observes: "Of course, what we spend in one category is in principle lost for the others. There are many possibilities of slippage: alcohol, war and holidays involve us in eroticism, but this means simply that the possible expenditures in one category are ultimately reduced by those we make in the others, so that only the profits found in war truly alter this principle; even so, in most cases these profits correspond to the losses of the vanquished.... We need to make a principle of the fact that sooner or later the sum of excess energy that is managed for us by a labor so great that it limits the share available for erotic purposes will be spent in a catastrophic war."(Bataille 1993: 188) Under these circumstances, the political choice becomes clear, expenditure can be wasted in war or applied to increase the standard of living. Finally, there is Bataille's enthusiasm for the Soviet socialism of his day. Here too, socialism is framed as an externality to capitalism, rather than being the latter's immanent condition. The Soviets form a geography of excess-that portion of global productive capacity that capitalist markets and development promises could not absorb. This perspective recasts Cold War bellicosity. The arms race certainly strains the Soviet social economy, as it supports a Western military-industrial complex. But the exclusion of more than half the world's peoples and territories by the partition of the three worlds was a condition for the concentration of consumption and masked the limits to its possible dispersion, as nearly two decades of post-Soviet opportunity now make plain. Still it was possible for Bataille to imagine the extension of a socialist geography as encroaching upon the ultimate utopian externality-the future. "Present day humanity has the communist horizon before it." (Bataille 1993: 261) Indeed the Cold War could be understood as a race toward disparate futures, each with their own utopian aspect, providing that the future remained on the horizon just outside of reach. Bataille has the benefit of imagining the chronotope of his own general economy as marked by clearly discernable divisions-between here and there, and between what is and what will come. He put such Cartesian formulations to tremendous effect, but we must consider what the general economy would consist of if history had not robbed us of that more clearly decidable grid of space and time. *finance* Still hot in pursuit of Bataille's horizon, we can now imagine capital's own tracks taking us toward a different mode of excess. These markings may map something apart from the post-fordist proliferation of the flexible which may have been more about clarifying what the initial formulation of a consumer society meant, than of what it would become. No doubt, stable and expanding careers of wage labor are now somewhat quaint, and mass consumption has been niched and customized in every conceivable direction. But what happens when production and consumption move in together, when one resides within the body of the other? Surely this is the generative condition of what is termed immaterial labor. It is also indicated where the investment logic of risk assumes the mantle of governmentality. Neoliberalism asked citizens to manage their own public good, insinuating a market trope where the state was meant to maintain its watchful eye. The domestic sphere is not simply an invitation to engage in home work (this it always was) but now also to serve as a platform for participation in myriad financial schemes, whether they be portfolios for retirement, education, or continued consumption itself. This implication of investment protocols in the labor of reproduction can be called financialization (Martin 2002). An ugly term perhaps but one that registers the invasion of capital for others into the realm of the self. Finance now occupies the spectre of excess in economic circulation. More than just acts of enclosure, financialization erupts where the socialization of capital meets the socialization of labor-amplifying mutual indebtedness, aggregating social wealth with extreme magnitude to the point where it moves from necessity to discretion. Finance signals a breach of referent that suggests huge sums can be applied anywhere for any purpose. The force of excess makes immediate the prospect that wealth might be applied otherwise. As much money moves in financial markets in a month as fills the accounts of industrial production in a year. The trade in derviatives alone-parsings of financial risk that disassemble and delocalize value so that it can be leveraged elsewhere-is tied to contracts valued at nearly $400 trillion. (Lipuma and Lee 2004: Bank of International Settlements, 2006) (Derivatives are identified by the value or notional price of the commodities that they are tied to, rather than to the amount of money they yield, which is but a fraction of that price. So, if one is paying $1,000 for the option to purchase $1,000,000 worth of Euros at a certain date, the contract is entered as $1,000,000 not $1,000). More than a vault of a determine form of capital, finance augurs an infectious logic that reorients the machinations of business as well a daily life. Banks no longer stand as intermediaries to circulation (disintermediation). Market share and stock price drive business planning (shareholder value). The speculative and the practical hedging of risk share instruments of operation (rentier capitalism). Even the state is internally riven between its neoliberal fantasy of leaving people alone to their fates, and the neoconservative obligations to intervene in private life to affect a kind of evangelical transformation or liberation. The neoconservative state intervenes to carve excess out of the social body by means of tax cuts, which are not simply redistributive to those most able to luxuriate, but to demonstrate the moral force behind setting capital free. But this freedom makes of those left behind, those populations incapable of managing themselves and termed "at risk," an accursed share in their own right. If financialization gives us production for and as consumption, ceaseless circulation nestled in what Marx called a "hidden abode," the implosion of the boundaries for enclosure liberate a whole matrix of capital from population. Bataille would see capital fleeing its social entailments of labor (whether wages or cities) to some secure outside-consumption, the state, or negatively in socialist topographies. The imbrication of production and consumption, the state's jettisoning of a general national interest, and a relinquishing of the socialist world has yielded a dizzying indifference. Rather than promising infinite absorption of population in accumulation, what was advertised under the watchwords of progress and development, liberation takes place in the here and now-a progressive and regressive freedom that turns against the history of difference (as all of the entanglements of social reproduction are brought together as interdependent demands for recognition, justice, resources and dispensation over what is done to make and live with social wealth).

#### Vote neg to jump into the Black hole. Come on, the water’s warm!

Murillo, 20—Assistant Professor, African American Studies School of Humanities, UC-Irvine (John, “Untimely Dispatch From the Middle of Nowhere 24,” Propter Nos Vol. 4 (2020), dml)

In its adherence to working with fragments, to accepting the absoluteness of fragmentation and the centrality of it to Black creative work, Zong!’s destructive approach to creation offers us a name for what it is we might best do with our untimeliness in the middle of nowhere: destructive writing. M. NourbeSe Philip’s poiesis is destruction. To leap into the Black w/hole of the text, the praxis, the theory, and the interpretive method necessary to operate on the same frequency of this work is to take very seriously the untimely, stanky, political-ontological relationship between Blackness, creation, and destruction. To “make generations” in the name of defending the dead, or to do the wake work, or to conjure the Black and cosmic magic, is to reckon with the paradoxical generativeness of destruction. It is to wholly embrace violence as violence, fragments as fragments, and incoherence as incoherence, in order to actively refuse, combat, and vie to destroy the very logic, or grammar, or order that murdered, continues to murder, and threatens to wholly obliterate Black being, or whatever deranged fragments of that being remain.

What have we done? What have we been doing? What should—must—we do? As we reflect upon the shards of thought, language, literary scene, physical property, lived experience, and unbearable inquiry that form the field of fragments we call Black Study, we consider how these arrangements we have made have all been an attempt at working with destruction. Arranging and deranging, ordering, reordering, and disordering, and always looking, listening, and attending to them carefully has always been the product of a continuous negotiation of the destructive forces that turned Black life and death into fragments. We spent our textual spacetime theorizing the nature of these forces in order to both, understand how they destroy us (how they work), and to begin to consider what ways we might refract/reflect them (how we can create with and from them). My arguments have turned on establishing the significance or rethinking these spatiotemporal forces and how they shatter our existences, indeed because rethinking time and space and how they play out upon us as a project on its own will help us better grasp the nature of our subjection to the various orders and structures of the antiblack world, but also because a deeper understanding of their mechanics and their essence radically transforms how we imagine, theorize, and perform Black creation.

I/we have performed our impossible alchemy thusly: (nigredo) disintegrate our core materials—time, space, and work—shedding the ashen detritus inessential to our work and leaving only what we need; (albedo) the distillation of what remains—untime, nowhere, and refraction—into the material we can synthesize into a greater conceptualization; and (rubedo) the synthesization of a new, vexing, abstract material that might reshape our understanding of Black existence and imaginative creation—destructive writing. While we knew and know our work aims to produce an alternative theory of Black creation that embraces and works with the destructive forces that make us untimely and displace us into nowhere, we perhaps (re)discover that our work is its own negotiation of destruction, our own staging of these principles of destructive writing. That invisible force suturing the fragments surrounding us into a field, that unseen thing that amplified the call of the fragments we sought out and were able to hold and behold, that animating element of untimeliness, refraction, and being nowhere: that undergirds the whole of this work, argumentatively and creatively, is destruction, and in our endeavor to make time and space for our considerations, we contemplate and imagine and write toward an answer to our most difficult set of questions.

How to tell a shattered story, one not meant to be passed on or passed on? How to “un-tell” a story that must be told?16 How to tell an impossible story?

Perhaps it is not exactly as Sharpe says. Perhaps the goal is not to ‘imagine the unimaginable’17 but, as part of the same refusal NourbeSe writes and performs, to radically un-imagine the imaginable.

How to defend the dead, the dying, and we who live untimely lives in the middle of nowhere?

By

becoming

everybody?

No.

*By destroying everything*.

Cowrie shells drag across the hard, wet wood. A constellation has been traced in water. A spell has been cast. A conjuring has taken place. We bear the water and the witness. We are a clamor of fragments in the oceanic dark. Telling and writing impossible stories is destructive work.

Telling, writing, and living impossible stories is destructive, dangerous work when deathliness, untimeliness, and stankiness are the conditions of whenever and wherever we try to be. To really listen to Ursa Corregidora’s blues18 and take the leap into the Black hole toward total destruction is to leap toward the singular possibility of radical, unimaginable, and impossible creation. Only in the dark and clamoring shatter, only from the nowhere of there and the untimeliness of then, might we really make time and space for one another.

Nothing less, nowhere else, and with no time to spare, we leap.

#### The alternative’s leap into the black hole overcomes the move towards restrictive economies that is foundational to the 1AC. Their siphoning of libidinal energies is a move towards the boiling point of civil society whereby blackness becomes the necessary informe for all political arrangements.

**Butler 21** [Daniel Butler, psychoanalytic psychotherapist and doctoral candidate in History of Consciousness, June 3, 2021, Psychoanalytic Dialogues The International Journal of Relational Perspective, “Fervish Nonknowledge, or Intuition at the Boiling Point”, Pages 284-292, JMH]

Hyperindustry feeds on “information without knowledge” (Stiegler, 2010, p. 129), which is to say that it flourishes without human intervention (e.g., mass automation).2 The hyperindustrial subject consumes endless streams of information, gradually forgetting how to produce as an agent within an information economy. Consumerism itself becomes the hyperindustrial subject’s most prolific form of production, and the product that the subject consumes above all is data. Manualized and prescriptive information about how to live (skills, techniques, etc.) substitutes for the savoir-vivre (knowing how to live) and savoir faire (know-how in general) through which one experiences living itself. Absolute nonknowledge mortifies, deadens, and leads to mass dissociation (Stiegler, 2018, p. 194), while digital technology is vitalized and divinized at the expense of psychosomatic life. Feverish nonknowledge struggles with this technological nihilism, in part by espousing the concept of informé over information. Informé is often translated as formless but means something closer to alteration, which, in the Latin (alter), connotes both a change of time and state (Krauss, 1993, p. 162), “moving [the subject] . . . in the sense of e-moting them” (Stiegler, 2018, p. 195), or orienting them to a future that is not or is not yet. The informé moves toward an abyss of nonknowledge, wherein the difference between subject and object is absent, but it does not move toward a transcendence of knowledge by way of information channels. Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow’s intuition as extraordinary knowing seemingly enacts such a transcendence, and in a world of computational capitalism or capitalism sans human labor, such extraordinary knowledge easily doubles as something like the algorithm that not only tells me what I want but notifies me that I want at all. The subject’s mimetic doubling as a cybernetic, extraordinary computer is exciting and even necessary for a “non-inhuman” future (Stiegler, 2013, 2018), and yet it currently besets us with a veritable confusion of tongues, specifically insofar as desire and libido are overwhelmed by digital technology and perhaps even overspecialized clinical technique, whereby intuition and spontaneity mimic algorithmic and programmatic formulas that the (neuro)sciences have always already foretold. To “know” is both about comportment or how-to and about the desire that is embedded in the term’s libidinized etymology. There is a default or a lack in relation to knowledge as a developmental acquisition, whereas information is always already thought to be there, like a thing without life that nevertheless exists. By contrast, “the transitional object . . . does not exist” (Stiegler, 2013, p. 1), which means that the child is feverishly oriented to an absence and the unknown as the epicenter of their most vitalizing encounters with play. Slightly emending Stielger, Winnicott’s (1975a) transitional phenomena yield a (non)knowledge that makes life worth living (Stiegler, 2013, 2018), and while this knowledge spreads across the cultural field, inspiring the various domains of knowledge production, Winnicott was not anticipating a world in which there is nowhere to hide, where subjects are so localizable and trackable, and where the privacy of the self that is necessary for transitional experiencing is supplanted by algorithms that threaten the most incommunicado enclosures of psychic space. The digital technologies that orient much of our everyday lives effectively collapse the superficiality of the image with the heterogeneity of the signifier, such that the image no longer represents the mysterious and incalculable play of signification (Han, 2020). Things are what they seem, and algorithmically produced images tell us what things are. Image economies contort the self into an assemblage of likes, notifications, and information channels that can be mapped by way of various imaging and tracking devices. The image functions like its own brand of religious iconography, even within the sciences themselves, such that the psyche becomes visible by way of neural imaging, which is in turn divinized as the incarnation of noetic life. Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow are rightly critical of biological reductionism, and they take heed not to fall into the same materialist traps. They critique a highly intractable Cartesianism within psychoanalysis and its scientistic opponents, and their critique advances “a unitary psychophysical paradigm,” which “requires a more accurate translation of physical and complexity concepts in order to mirror the interpenetration of body/brain/mind informational dynamics in the clinical setting” (this issue, p. 278). They express concern at psychoanalysis’ alienation from the sciences, in part due to the former’s misapplication of scientific concepts. This is not only a pedantic point but a sincere and laudable effort on their part to cross a disciplinary divide. Larger cultural and psychopolitical reasons account for this divide in a more robust way, but their metaphor shifts are nonetheless instructive. Among the shifts, we have intersubjective “matrix” rather than intersubjective “field,” but we also have interobjectivity, a term that has no clear precursor in psychoanalysis and that denotes “the existence of a unitary objective reality of which we are all an integral part” (this issue, p. 276). The post-Cartesian amalgam of transsubjective and interobjective boundaries suggests a lifeworld in which “we are all an integrated part of psychophysical reality, where material processes and processes of the mind merge below the surface of the classical macroworld” (this issue, p. 276). We are always already connected by the information that is superordinate to representation and signification, which would of course include the world of cultural stereotypes, but to make this point – a point which partly derives from Bohm’s theoretical physics – is itself an utterance that, like all language games (Lyotard, 1984), is socioculturally and psychopolitcally contingent, if only because scientific and technological advances cannot escape the histories and libidinal economics of slavery, capitalism, and colonialism that made (and continue to make) them possible (Jackson, 2019; Lyotard, 1984). Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow’s post-Cartesianism seems to enfold metapsychology into natural science, such that the claims of psychoanalysis need to be coordinated with natural science if the interdisciplinary dialogue is to sustain itself. This is not a dialectic of natural science and metapsychology, for there is no struggle or agonism. Natural science, for our authors, is the way, which seems clear in their plea for a metaphor shift, and which also appears to be a shift, ironically enough, away from metaphor. Metaphor plays with the real, but play, in its most enlivening form, is an offense to the real insofar it reveals the latter’s contingency (Barthes, 1972). Thus, the metaphorical and the scientific agonistically meet at the boiling point, where the task for each is to survive a potentially annihilating show of difference. In practice, this is typically not what happens, and the adaptation of psychoanalysis to natural science, as in the metaphor shift, disavows the psychopolitical conditions that make such a shift so seemingly imperative. In a hyperindustrial society, where the profits of computational capitalism see no end in sight, the humanities and social sciences are often called upon to adapt to STEM models as if there is no other choice, and while this is no reason to dismiss STEM as an ally, there is good reason to query the ways in which a move toward STEM within non-STEM fields is overdetermined by sociocultural and political-economic threats to the latter’s existence. If psychoanalysis is indeed trying to survive this era of the so-called dark enlightenment, what this means, at least according to the admittedly more pessimistic tendencies in media philosophy, is that digital technology increasingly dominates if not replaces the psyche itself, largely by siphoning off libidinal energy; and what this diagnosis means for the collaboration between science and metapsychology is that the psychic subject of such collaboration is increasingly dead and dissociated or without much of a psyche to investigate. Is this why we might manically search for intuitive moments of transubjectivity, where rather than contending with feverish nonknowledge, we long for the intuition or extraordinary knowledge Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow so convincingly (and beautifully) narrate in their clinical vignettes? We might wonder about the search for extraordinary knowing from a psychopolitical perspective, given that the psychopolitcal struggle of our contemporary is, in my view, less about control over informational than libidinal economies or more about a struggle to feel alive as the precondition of that which enables us to know (for Bataille, knowing and living are, at root, incommensurable, even if the latter exceeds and anticipates the former); and while the natural sciences can indeed become a necessary comrade in this struggle, they are heavily instrumental in (and the least informed about) the deadening and proletarianization of psychosomatic life. Such proletarianization does not invigorate an underclass ala Marx but invades the subject’s nervous system ala Stiegler (2010); it is a generalized condition of “mindpsyches,” to use Winnicott’s (1975b) term. This diagnosis points to a massive psychic and political problem, and it is why psychoanalytic engagements with sciences demand a continual awareness of the science’s proletarianizing function in hyperindustrial society. While far from their presumable intent, Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow’s metaphor shift could read like a proletarianizing gesture, insofar as psychoanalysis is asked to become more useful and productive to the sciences, instead of being critical, offensive, or even ruinous of the computational capitalism that basically controls the sciences as its handmaiden, and that leaves so many clinical dyads bored, unfilled, and generally unavailable for the varieties of intuition that Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow delineate. Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow specifically acknowledge Bion (and Jung) for bringing intuition into the psychoanalytic mainstream. Unlike Freud’s (1911) reality principle as the neonate’s confrontation with a frustrating unpleasure, Bion’s intuition apperceives a continuous reality that is irreducible to any spatiotemporal or psychosomatic coordinates. This ultimate reality is a global form of psychic continuity that many psychoanalysts are wary of due to its mystical connotations, but from a quantum physics perspective, such mysticism is partly dispelled by way of thinkers like Bohm, whose “implicate order” informs Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow’s holistic theory of intuition. I say holistic because they, like Bohm, treat “the mental and the material” as an implicate order, or “[as] two sides of one reality” (Bohm, 1987, p. 20), and this unitary reality or Jung’s unus mundus facilitates nonlocal information sharing and the extraordinary knowing of intuition. For Bohm, Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow, the concept of wholeness is (explicitly, in Bohm’s case) tied to humanity and its survival. Conversely, Bataille’s boundlessness is a boiling point in relation to which human survival is risked and existentially held in suspense.3 Bataille argues that totalities cannot be conceptualized except by imaginary means, which is to say that a totality requires a thought from outside that undermines the totality itself. By extension, the greatest scientific truth is also the undoing of science or a transcendence of the point at which the object of science slips from view. This is not to suggest that science is unreal but that it is realest when it calls on the imaginary for its meaning or when its greatest meaning hinges on the disavowal of its insignificance. Where Bataille’s boundlessness aspires to an abundance of meaning that tips the scale into an absence of meaning, Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow implicitly reject such absence by aligning their nonlocal neurodynamics with concepts like the unus mundus and the implicate order, both of which transcend meaninglessness through a superordinate metanarrative of wholeness. Feverish with nonknowledge, the Bataillean subject does not turn to metanarrative to account for the boiling point’s beyond. Stielger’s teacher, Jean-Francois Lyotard, deserves mention here, especially since, in The Postmodern Condition – his still highly relevant “report on knowledge” that was commissioned by the Quebec government – he makes specific reference to quantum physics and to the hyperindustrial inversion of science and technology, whereby the latter now exploits the former rather than functioning as a scientific tool.4 Lyotard (1984) acknowledges that “quantum theory and microphysics require a far more radical revision of the idea of a continuous and predictable path,” but its “quest for precision is . . . limited . . . by the very nature of matter. It is not true that uncertainty (lack of control) decreases as accuracy goes up: it goes up as well” (p. 56). Lyotard continues with a reference to physicist Jean Perrin, whose study of air molecules, Lyotard argues, “resolves into a multiplicity of absolutely incompatible statements; they can only be made compatible if they are relativized in relation to a scale chosen by the speaker” (p. 57). Knowledge reaches its limit in this incompatibility, and this is where science draws on the imaginary and plays language games or creates a meta-language to legitimate itself, which in turn relativizes its status as “scientific.” This crisis of knowledge is traceable to the late-nineteenth century when metanarratives ala Hegel’s science of Spirit, Marx’s critique of capitalism, and Darwin’s theory of evolution no longer inspired faith in ineluctable progress and/or preordained emancipation. While the materialist turn in humanities and social sciences tends to lambast what appears to be a crude subjectivism in such “postmodern” thought (a critique Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow seem to share), it is less that Lyotard assumes matter only exists as an epistemological construction than that the sciences are partly contingent on metanarratives (or micronarratives) for their legitimation.5 Bohm’s holism would seem to be such a metanarrative. In order to supplement the localinteractive dynamics of interpersonal neurobiology with the nonlocal-participatory dynamics of quantum physics, Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow turn to thinkers like Bohm, who “postulated a unifying domain of active information, which underlies both matter and mind processes,” such that “matter loses its appearance of solidity and separate locality” (p. 18). Contra Bohm’s implicate order, Bataille’s espousal of boundlessness and nonknowledge suggests that any unity cannot account for the contingency by which it is constituted. In a conversation with Bohm (1987), an audience member challenges Bohm’s subsumption of contingency into wholeness, and Bohm (1987) admits to the speculative nature of his insights, adding “we are making models and . . . they are not models of ultimate reality, but proposals” (p. 57); the question, he notes, is “which presupposition are we choosing” (p. 53), and by presupposition Bohm would seem to mean the metaphysical premises, however propositional, that promote a world in which we want to live. Bohm is aware of the hermeneutics involved in interpreting science, but perhaps he is less aware of how the hermeneutic choices we make may or may not struggle against some of the more repressive forces that characterize every historical conjuncture. Like Bohm’s implicate order, the hermeneutic of Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow’s “inherent wholeness that unites us all” (this issue, p. 279) is arguably premised on a disavowed metaphysics as much as it is a speculative psychophysics. Their information channels that traverse psyche and physis are not, in my view, socially, politically, and culturally neutral. Borrowing a locution from afropessimist Frank Wilderson (2010), we might say that Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow’s conception of wholeness grounds itself in the “assumptive logic” of human ontology, which, even when recast according to an impersonal physics of information channels, takes for granted the “us” who are supposedly united. Following an anti-humanist reading of thinkers like Fanon, afropessimists do not accord human status to black “subjects,”6 and this discord extends to the natural sciences for at least two reasons: one, because anti-black violence epigenetically dehumanizes bodies that are epidermally black, thus leading to neurobiological conditions such as weathering (Jackson, 2019); and two, because modernity is built on economies of slavery that have libidinally and capitalistically funded scientific research as early as the Indian Ocean slave trade of 7th century Arabia (Vaziri, 2019).7 Whether one agrees with such positions or not, they surely highlight the contested terrain of the natural sciences, which is different from simply writing the sciences off or dismissing the realism on which scientific truths are based. When we speak of intuition, we might thus consider a racialized variety, namely that which reveals blackness as a potentially lethal encounter with the informé (Butler, 2020). I have written about this in relation to resignation syndrome as a condition that petrifies the refugee child into a protracted state of hallucinosis. Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow’s When we speak of intuition, we might thus consider a racialized variety, namely that which reveals blackness as a potentially lethal encounter with the informé (Butler, 2020). I have written about this in relation to resignation syndrome as a condition that petrifies the refugee child into a protracted state of hallucinosis. Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow’s. The nonlocal effects of an antiblack geopolitics thus register psychically as a blackness that is informé rather than informational or an absence that begins with the condemnation and denigration of black flesh but that shapes the psychopolitics of hypermodernity such that blackness is the primally repressed thing against and around which the psyche itself is formed. Blackness is constitutive of the psyche insofar as the latter is organized around the former as an inassimilable absence, but what this means for black “subjects,” at least according to a certain reading of Fanon, is that the psyche – and most definitely the psychophysical – is only ever legible as white (or as that which is not black, not the thing). Grappling with such thought seems crucial for the frontiers of psychoanalysis and the natural sciences, which Fanon, a psychoanalytic clinician, and experimental neuropsychiatrist, already knew. Like Fanon, many black critical theorists refuse the concept of psychophysical unity for the same reason they refuse the notion of a science that is not already saturated with stereotypes. After all, Fanon (2004) is decisive in stating that antiblack colonization creates a species division, such that the very concept of the human undergoes a lysis in which the black subject is psychically and physically jettisoned from the family of man. Lyotard’s critique in The Postmodern Condition (1984) addresses the way in which scientific knowledge is inextricable from a political–economic relationship to technology that metanarratives unwittingly work to obscure. In effect, metanarratives themselves serve the technical function of naturalizing science itself, as if the study of nature is not socially, politically, and economically motivated. Technology has historically aided human perception so that scientific observation becomes increasingly reliable, but this optimization of the scientific project is now firmly coupled with the logic of capitalism, where minimal input (e.g., automation) yields maximal output (surplus value), and where “an equation between p. 45). If the sciences now produce data and information that perpetuates absolute nonknowledge, this is because of the libidinal and economic surplus that their subordination to hyperindustry yields, not because there is something inherently insidious about science or technology. And yet, if Lyotard is right about the coupling of science and capital, how might the sciences critically account for that coupling so as to distance themselves from its proletarianizing effects? A proletarianized world thrives on speculation and superstition rather than investment and the time that it takes to develop knowledge. What Stiegler calls proletarianization, Achille Mbembe refers to as the becoming Black of the world (Mbembe & Stiegler, 2019), by which Mbembe means, in part, that historically denigrated African cosmologies now explain how objectified human life can become animated by perversely vitalized technologies. “The human person is trying to turn himself or herself into a thing or manufactured object” (Mbembe, 2016, 1:02:58), which is to say that they are becoming Black, specifically insofar as blackness is naturalized as an animate thing by antiblack and colonial imaginaries that still found our national settings (Butler, 2019b). In tandem with this turn toward animism, Mbembe (2016) notes the rise of interest in new materialisms, occult phenomena, and speculative realisms, all of which, in their own way, intersect with the transsubjective in Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow. Transcendent connectedness and unmediated access to the (im)material world inspires manic reparation that allows proletarianized populations to adapt to an antiblack techno-capitalism by feeling as though they can access otherworldly truths. Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow invite us to consider how the clinical setting of local-interactive processes is always already informed by much more expansive, nonlocal, or even subatomic settings or information channels, and thinkers like Mbembe remind us of the way in which such channels and technologies (e.g., settings) are historically, ontologically, and geopolitically racialized phenomena that always already condition the nonlocal as a concept. In a vitalist and animistic world in which technology is sovereign, some kind of rupture in local or nonlocal connection, a rupture in which information becomes informé, could recalibrate technology’s relationship to psychosomatic life. For Bataille, the informé “serves to bring things down in the world . . . what it designates has no rights in any sense and gets itself squashed everywhere, like a spider or an earthworm” (Bataille, 1985, p. 31). The informé is like a debased life that paradoxically underscores the basics about what makes life matter. Like Winnicott (1971), Bataille sees the need for a formlessness that is never (in) formed but that remains an excess that is sacred in its indispensability. If information travels in an ultimately productive way, folding and unfolding bits of communicable data, the informé definitively interrupts such production, squashing the informational like a worm underfoot. Bataille goes so far as to view the universe as informé, as nothing, or the absence of meaning, and this absence is pharmacological in that it can be both a poison or a cure, inspiring creation or portending death. Bataille’s interwar and postwar writings meditate on a violence that is gratuitous, that admits no meaning, and that he, out of a vigorous anti-idealism, locates in a debased cosmos. His thought experiments press humanity to ask if it is implicated in a monstrosity that doubles as its disavowed constitution. This is a question natural science struggles to consider, especially when under the sway of a bio- and psychopolitical techno-capitalism in which the endless optimization of concomitantly automated life is the goal. All of Bataille’s concepts involve a question of the limit or the point at which life resembles (without simply becoming) its opposite, death. For Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow, the notion of a limit may be overly physical, energic, or material, whereas information deals less with limits than with the seriality of sharing across limitless channels or networks. There thus appears to be little room for the negativity of the informé in Shapiro and MarksTarlow’s thought. The clinical and psychopolitical implications of this are quite interesting, and many of them circle the question of physical and psychic death, not the mention of the death drive as a psychoanalytic construct. For example, how does one conceptualize breakdown in the analysis without some concept of a limit to the informational channels by which clinician and patient are putatively bound? How does one conceptualize the afterlife of social and political disasters ala slavery and colonialism, which, at least for many victims, would seem to be quite gratuitous and informé rather than somehow informational and nascently meaningful? A psychoanalysis without excess – or a psychoanalysis in which excess is always already contained by wholeness – offers a post- or even anti-Freudian vision of psychic and political life. To take a Bataillean and perhaps more Freudian tack, the avowal of excess is not some accelerationist acquiescence to total annihilation, but an opening to radically new and unknown psychopolitical vistas. Transitional experience and primary preoccupation are paradigmatic of such an avowal. For example, in the case of a subject’s excessive libido, the shock of such excess functions as a psychosomatic invention ala Freud’s (1990) protective shield, and this invention is what paradoxically enables the subject to survive its own drivebased undoing. Put otherwise, such shock is an excitation that defends against the perils of excitation itself (Aulagnier, 2001; Miller, 2014), which is why, in an adjacent register, Stoekl (2007) argues that conservation and sustainability should not be the focus of environmental politics and that Bataille’s post-sustainable politics of nonproductive expenditure might be a better alternative. (If the world is made of excess energy, then it should be spent rather than conserved, the question being how it is spent rather than whether to spend it or not.) Bataille (2018) associates this beneficent yet potentially annihilating expenditure with play, which in turn evokes the early caregiving through which the infant learns how to weather the drives (Butler, 2019a; Winnicott, 1975a). In theory, science could function as a protective shield against the shock of hyperindustrial society, but the formation of this shield would require the sciences’ commitment to reckoning with their own psychopolitical and epistemological excesses. In work that has the potential to shift some of the more prominent paradigms of relational psychoanalysis, perhaps Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow can consider some excesses I have in mind. We can certainly think of nonlocal-participatory processes in apolitical terms, but they are only truly apolitical when they falter as a holism; such faltering is the absence, the boiling point, as both the whole’s excess and its most key ingredient. Such is the counterintuitively apolitical moment of revolution when it is simply the fight that is at stake, not any ideology for which one is fighting. Bataille’s is not a politics of sustainability and conservation – a politics compatible with a humanistic predilection for wholeness. While there may be unspoken affinities (or overstated differences) between Bataille and our authors, on the surface the differences seem quite clear; rather than highlighting what unites us all, Bataille highlights the unknowable excess by which unity is constituted and perennially undone (Rossi, 2019). The ethical question then becomes what we do with social, physical, and ontological excess, rather than how can we better account for such excess through a wholeness by which we are all supposedly bound. If the sciences have no conception of excess, of the libidinal, of the boiling point, and all we have is a holistic system, then the only (false) choice is to adapt, which is how proletarianization becomes a disturbingly logical – if not somehow intuitive – way to live.

## Case

### 1NC – Advantage

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war.

Walt 20 – Stephen Walt, International Relations Professor at Harvard University. [Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War? 5-13-20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/]

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”

Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success.

Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then.

The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.

#### The plan tumbles antitrust into an unworkable mess, obliterating growth.

Baye ’20 [Michael Baye, James Cooper, Kenneth Elzinga, Deborah Garza, Thomas Hazlett, Benjamin Klein, Tad Lipsky, Scott Masten, Maureen Ohlhausen, James Rill, Vernon Smith, Robert Willig, Joshua Wright, and John Yun, with some professors omitted for convenience; May 20; Former Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics, Bert Elwert Professor of Business at Indiana University; Former Acting and Deputy Director of the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning; Economics Professor at the University of Virginia; Chair of the Antitrust Modernization Commission, Former Acting and Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division; Former Chief Economist of the FCC, Economics Professor at Clemson University; Economics Professor at UCLA; Former Acting Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division; Business Economics and Public Policy at the University of Michigan; Former Acting Chairman & Commissioner of the FTC; Former Assistant Attorney General of DOJ’s Antitrust Division; Nobel Laureate in Economics and Professor at Chapman University; Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics at the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, Economics and Public Affairs Professor at Princeton University; Former Commissioner of the FTC, Law Professor at George Mason University; Former Acting Deputy Assistant Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics, Law Professor at George Mason University; “Joint Submission Of Antitrust Economists, Legal Scholars, And Practitioners To The House Judiciary Committee On The State Of Antitrust Law And Implications For Protecting Competition In Digital Markets,” <https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/house_joint_antitrust_letter_20200514.pdf>]

We write because the modern antitrust debate has become characterized by sustained attacks on the integrity of antitrust institutions and by unsubstantiated dismissals of debate. This atmosphere has led to a variety of proposals for radical changes to the antitrust laws and their enforcement that we believe are unsupported by the evidence, counterproductive to promoting competition and consumer welfare, and offered with an unwarranted degree of certainty.

Vigorous debate and disagreement have long been a hallmark of antitrust scholarship and policy. Competition policy has been formed through an iterative process echoed in the courts’ evolving doctrine over more than a century.1 Today, however, efforts to sidestep the discussion, or to declare it over, and to force hasty and far-reaching changes have come to the fore. These proposals are numerous and include: (1) abandoning the consumer welfare standard;2 (2) overturning unanimous and supermajority judicial precedents, which are foundational to modern antitrust law; 3 (3) imposing obsolete and arbitrary market share tests to determine the legality of mergers;4 (4) shifting the burden of proof from plaintiffs to defendants to render large swaths of business behavior presumptively unlawful;5 (5) creating another federal regulator to oversee competition in digital markets;6 (6) breaking up major tech companies or their products without evidence of antitrust harm or that the remedy would make consumers better off; 7 and (7) imposing a general prohibition on all mergers either involving specific firms or during the current health crisis.8

Such proposals would abandon the legal and political traditions that helped transform antitrust from an unprincipled and incoherent body of law, marred by internal contradictions, into a workable system that contributes positively to American competitiveness and consumer welfare. It should be noted that we use the term “consumer welfare” throughout this letter, consistent with modern parlance about competition policy, to include the benefits of competition to the welfare of workers and other input suppliers, as well as consumers. Thus, the consumer welfare standard is not a narrowly circumscribed objective, but rather a prescription for the general social wellbeing generated by the competitive process. By contrast, many of the current proposals would (1) undermine the rule of law; (2) undo the healthy evolution of antitrust law in the courts over time; (3) require antitrust agencies to micromanage the economy by picking winners and losers; (4) abandon a focus on consumer welfare in favor of vague and politically-oriented goals; and (5) undermine successful American businesses and their competitiveness in the global economy at the worst-imaginable time.

The assertions about the state of antitrust law and policy that purportedly justify these radical changes are not supported by the evidence. A more accurate reading of the evidence supports the following view of the American economy and the role of antitrust law:

1. The American economy—including the digital sector—is competitive, innovative, and serves consumers well. Debate about whether the antitrust laws should be fundamentally re-written originated from a concern that markets have recently become more concentrated and that competition had decreased as a result. The popular narrative, that increases in concentration have caused harm to competition throughout the economy, does not withstand close scrutiny. In reality, most markets in the American economy—including digital markets—are competitive, and thriving, and create huge benefits for consumers.
2. Structural changes in the economy have resulted from increased competition. The economic data show that intense competition, winner-take-all rivalry, and the adoption of new successful technologies in relevant antitrust markets were major economic forces that led to structural changes (i.e., increased national-level concentration) in the economy. The existence of these structural changes does not itself support changes in the law.
3. Lax antitrust enforcement has not allowed systematic increases in market power. There is little evidence to support the view that anemic antitrust enforcement has led to a systematic rise in market power in the American economy. The evidence is especially weak as it relates to digital markets.
4. Existing antitrust law is adequate for protecting competition in the modern economy. Antitrust law has developed incrementally through the common law approach. A strength of antitrust law is that it can incorporate learning about new business practices and economics to protect competition in an evolving economy. The existing antitrust laws and enforcement framework, when correctly applied, are more than adequate to deter anticompetitive conduct today, including in new and growing digital markets.
5. History teaches that discarding the modern approach to antitrust would harm consumers. Many of the radical reforms being proposed today seek to return antitrust to what it was in the 1960s. But antitrust during that time was based primarily on per se rules that prohibited economic analysis and fact-based defenses. This created a body of law, fundamentally marred by internal contradiction, that frequently protected individual competitors over consumers and did not focus on the central goal of protecting competition. Congress has considered and rejected radical proposals to overhaul antitrust in the past and should do so again.

#### Their narrative of development separates the violence of racial unfreedom from their forms of liberation through capitalism

Atanasoski and Vora, 19 – Neda Atanasoski, Professor of Feminist Studies and Critical Race and Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz; Kalindi Vora, Associate Professor of Gender, Sexuality and Women's Studies at UC Davis; 2019(*Surrogate Humanity: Race, Robots, and the Politics of Technological Futures*, Duke University Press, Accessed via Michigan Libraries, pg 30-33, bam)

The fear that automation heralds human obsolescence is in one sense as old as the modern systems of labor and production. At the same time, human obsolescence is also always in and of a dystopic future not quite yet upon us. Starting with the Luddites, English workers who destroyed textile mills in a series of riots beginning in 1811 because of fears that they would lose their jobs, there have been waves of response to the development of industrial technologies that have all led to the same question: When will human labor be rendered completely redundant by machine labor? In 1930, the economist John Maynard Keynes coined the term technological unemployment to capture a dilemma similar to that of the Luddites, namely the problem that escalates when technological developments outpace so- ciety’s ability to find new uses for human labor. At the same time, Keynes argued that this was only a temporary phase of maladjustment.

The specter of human obsolescence undergirds both utopic and dystopic approaches to technological modernity and the surrogate effect of technologies that are hoped to liberate, and at the same time feared to obliterate, the human subject. Automation and technological futures make especially legible the ways that labor continues to be a central site through which freedom and unfreedom racially demarcate the bounds of the fully human. If the human condition (in the Arendtian sense) is defined in terms of how one acts in and upon the world, including through work and labor, then dreams of mechanization are never just about efficiency, but also inevitably about the kinds of work and labor that are unfit for a human to perform.4 In this way, we can think of automation as historically tied to the promise and threat of the liberation of human laborers. Put otherwise, even as machines enact the surrogate human effect in areas that can be automated, they also produce a surrogate (nonworker) humanity liberated from prior states of unfreedom. Yet automated utopias in which the human worker has been emancipated from miserable (dull, degrading, and repetitive) work are also tethered to dystopias in which the liberated subject is dissolved as replaceable and, therefore, potentially obsolete.

Hannah Arendt argued that labor, work, and politics were central to how the tensions between human freedom and unfreedom would develop as automation played an ever-increasing role in social and economic struc- tures. In the 1958 preface to The Human Condition, Arendt speculates that automation, “which in a few decades probably will empty factories and liberate mankind from its oldest and most natural burden, the burden of laboring and the bondage to necessity,” will lead to a society that no longer knows its purpose.5 As she elaborates, “It is a society of laborers which is about to be liberated from the fetters of labor, and this society does no longer know of those higher and more meaningful activities for the sake of which this freedom would deserve to be won. . . . What we are confronted with is the prospect of a society of laborers without labor, that is, without the only activity left to them.”6 Arendt outlines the vita activa, a philosophy detailing three fundamental human activities: labor, work, and action. For Arendt, labor is what must be done to reproduce human life; work creates the world of things; and action, the third human condition, constitutes our social being, and is therefore inherently political. She proposes that as workers entered society and were no longer outside of it (after the granting of an annual wage that transformed a “class society” into a “mass society”), the potential of the radical political movement as a workers’ movement dissipated.7 Arendt’s fears grew out of her contention that we have become a society where to be a subject means being a laborer, but without the step of proletarianization that was the engine of Marx’s teleology of anticapitalist revolution. Proletarianization was the essence of Marx’s new historical subject of labor, which arose out of industrialization and the need to sell labor for a wage. Arendt was concerned that in distinction to what Marxists would believe, without the unifying class experience of laboring for a wage in a laborless society, and without the social and interactive condition of what she calls the vita activa, the promise of technological liberation is empty.

Crucially, Arendt’s figure of the laborer as social-historical subject is based upon her distinction between slavery as a nonmodern economic form and modern capitalism. She writes, “In contrast to ancient slave emancipations, where as a rule the slave ceased to be a laborer when he ceased to be a slave, and where, therefore, slavery remained the social condition of labor- ing no matter how many slaves were emancipated, the modern emancipa- tion of labor was intended to elevate the laboring activity itself, and this was achieved long before the laborer as a person was granted personal and civil rights.” Arendt writes that “the incapacity of the animal laborans for distinction and hence for action and speech seems to be confirmed by the striking absence of serious slave rebellions in ancient and modern times.”8 She distinguishes this from the successes and revolutionary potential of the 1848 European revolutions and the Hungarian revolution of 1956, organized around the working class.

According to Nikhil Pal Singh, the tendency to separate slavery (or the state of unfreedom) from the period of modern capitalist development misses the ways in which “the chattel slave was a new kind of laboring being and a new species of property born with capitalism.”9 The dependence of chattel slavery on race concepts in turn fostered “the material, ideological, and affective infrastructures of appropriation and dispossession that have been indispensable to the rise of capitalism.”10 According to Singh, not only does the “differentiation between slavery and capitalism [widen] the gulf between slaves and workers,” but it also “overlooks how racial, ethnic, and gender hierarchies in laboring populations are retained as a mechanism of labor discipline and surplus appropriation, and even as a measure of capitalism’s progressivism, insofar as it purports to render such distinctions anachronistic in the long run.”11 For Arendt, the plurality of a dif- ferentiated polity is the condition of possibility for freedom. Thus, her collapsing of Nazi fascism and Soviet totalitarianism as equivalent conditions of unfreedom for the undifferentiated masses affirms a liberal politics. Instead, Singh proposes that “Capital ceases to be capital without the ongoing differentiation of free labor and slavery, waged labor and unpaid labor as a general creative basis. . . . Only by understanding the indebtedness of freedom to slavery, and the entanglement and coconstitution of the two, can we attain a critical perspective adequate to a genuinely anticapitalist politics.”12 Singh’s critique points not only to the ongoing imbrications of conditions of unfreedom and liberal capitalist development, but also to how the disavowal of the worker without consciousness (the slave, the un- free) depends upon the false dichotomy between fascism and liberalism.

This elision of the entanglement of fascism, racial violence, and liberal developmentalism is replicated in the technoliberal imaginary of human obsolescence in a postlabor world. The racial and gendered structures of production, both material and social, that continue to demand an abject and totally submissive workforce reevidence themselves in the practices and fantasies surrounding the role of robot workers. Utopic hopes of freeing human workers through evolving iterations of unfree labor (as automated solutions to the racial contradictions upon which free labor is predicated) also bring forward colonial fantasies of the other as a nonsubject. Lacking political consciousness, the robot, which stands in for colonized and enslaved labor, cannot stage a revolution. In this sense, the freedom of the fully human liberal subject cannot come to be without the unfreedom of the less than human or the nonhuman.

#### That post-racial understanding of economics cements the racial order of humanism and accelerates capitalist exploitation of the Global South

Atanasoski and Vora, 19 – Neda Atanasoski, Professor of Feminist Studies and Critical Race and Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz; Kalindi Vora, Associate Professor of Gender, Sexuality and Women's Studies at UC Davis; 2019( “Introduction: The Surrogate Human Effects of Technoliberalism,” *Surrogate Humanity: Race, Robots, and the Politics of Technological Futures*, Duke University Press, Accessed via Michigan Libraries, pg 12-14, bam)

Autonomy and consciousness, even when projected onto techno-objects that populate accounts of capitalist futurity, continue to depend on a racial relational structure of object and subject. We describe this symbolic ordering of the racial grammar of the liberal subject the “surrogate human effect.” As technology displaces the human chattel-turned-man with man- made objects that hold the potential to become conscious (and therefore autonomous, rights-bearing liberal subjects freed from their exploitative conditions), the racial and gendered form of the human as an unstable category is further obscured. Technoliberalism’s version of universal humanity heralds a postrace and postgender world enabled by technology, even as that technology holds the place of a racial order of things in which humanity can be affirmed only through degraded categories created for use, exploitation, dispossession, and capitalist accumulation. As Lisa Lowe articulates, “racial capitalism suggests that capitalism expands not through rendering all labor, resources, and markets across the world identical, but by precisely seizing upon colonial divisions, identifying particular regions for production and others for neglect, certain populations for exploitation, and others for disposal.”23 As we show throughout the chapters of this book—which range in scope from examining how technological progress is deployed as a critique of white supremacy since the advent of Trumpism, effectively masking how the fourth industrial revolution and the second machine age have accelerated racialized and gendered differentiation, to how the language of the sharing economy has appropriated socialist conceptions of collaboration and sharing to further the development of capitalist exploitation—within present-day fantasies of techno-futurity there is a reification of imperial and racial divisions within capitalism. This is the case even though such divisions are claimed to be overcome through technology.

Surrogate Humanity contends that the engineering imaginaries of our technological future rehearse (even as they refigure) liberalism’s production of the fully human at the racial interstices of states of freedom and unfreedom. We use the term technoliberalism to encompass the techniques through which liberal modernity’s simultaneous and contradictory obsession with race and its irrelevance has once again been innovated at the start of the twenty-first century, with its promises of a more just future enabled by technology that will ostensibly result in a postrace, postlabor world. This is also a world in which warfare and social relations are performed by machines that can take on humanity’s burdens. Technological objects that are shorthand for what the future should look like inherit liberalism’s version of an aspirational humanity such that technology now mediates the freedom–unfreedom dynamic that has structured liberal futurity since the post-Enlightenment era. Put otherwise, technoliberalism proposes that we are entering a completely new phase of human eman- cipation (in which the human is freed from the embodied constraints of race, gender, and even labor) enabled through technological development. However, as we insist, the racial and imperial governing logics of liberalism continue to be at the core of technoliberal modes of figuring human freedom. As Ruha Benjamin puts it, “technology . . . is . . . a metaphor for innovating inequity.”24 To make this argument, she builds on David Theo Goldberg’s assessment of postraciality in the present, which exists “today alongside the conventionally or historically racial. . . . In this, it is one with contemporary political economy’s utterly avaricious and limitless appetites for the new.”25 Yet amid assertions of technological newness, as Benjamin demonstrates, white supremacy is the default setting.

Technoliberalism embraces the “post”-racial logic of racial liberalism and its conception of historical, economic, and social newness, limiting the engineering, cultural, and political imaginaries of what a more just and equal future looks like within technological modernity. As we propose, race and its disciplining and governing logics are engineered into the form and function of the technological objects that occupy the political, cultural, and social armature of technoliberalism. Rather than questioning the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of the human, fantasies about what media outlets commonly refer to as the revolutionary nature of tech- nological developments carry forward and reuniversalize the historical specificity of the category human whose bounds they claim to surpass.

#### No revisionism NOR impact

David C. Kang & Xinru Ma 18, Maria Crutcher Professor in International Relations, Business and East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Southern California; Visiting scholar at the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California, “Power Transitions: Thucydides Didn’t Live in East Asia,” The Washington Quarterly,

Yet after that century of chaos, China has once again already completed a regional power transition. It has done so astonishingly quickly, and it has done so peacefully. China’s share of regional GDP grew from 8 percent in 1990 to 51 percent in 2014, while Japan’s share fell from 72 percent in 1990 to 22 percent today (Figure 1).

As China has grown richer and more integrated within East Asia itself, East Asian defense spending has steadily declined. The proportion of the economy devoted to defense spending is now almost half of what it was in 1990 and shows no sign of increasing (Figure 2). Specifically, the defense spending of eleven main East Asian states (the same 11 countries cited in Figure 1) declined from an average of 3.35 percent of GDP in 1990 to an average of 1.84 percent in 2015.

These two figures tell an accurate, enduring, and often overlooked story about East Asia. China has already managed a head-spinningly fast regional power transition. The only question is how much larger the gap between China and its neighbors will become. Countries are rapidly increasing their economic ties to China and each other. And East Asian countries have steadily reduced their defense spending, which suggests these countries think most of the region’s unresolved issues are not worth fighting over. All countries in the region have to coexist with each other—none are picking up and moving somewhere else. Countries are dealing with that reality and seeking diplomatic rather than military solutions with each other.

The standard response to more than a quarter-century of stability is to credit the United States: all Asian countries “must be” free-riding on a U.S. commitment to the region. However, this runs counter to the evidence that over the same time period, the U.S. military commitment has declined, U.S. attention has wavered, and indeed the perception of U.S. inattention over the past few decades even prompted the Obama administration to claim it was “pivoting” to Asia. These two trends are hard to square: if East Asian countries did not respond even to reductions in U.S. deployments and attention, then perhaps they do not see the remaining issues worth fighting over. After all, these countries show no signs of hedging, in either their economic relations with China or in their military expenditures. If countries were worried and thought the United States might leave, they would presumably be preparing at least in part for that possibility. Instead, the defense spending trends show powerfully a steady, decades-long reduction, even in the face of massive increases in Chinese power and wavering U.S. commitment to the region.

This East Asian reality runs counter to a largely Western narrative of threat inflation that views China’s rise as dangerous and the region as increasingly unstable. Indeed, for over a quarter century, some scholars have made dire and continued predictions that East Asia is going to experience an arms race, that the regional security dilemma is intensifying, and that dangerous instability driven by China is just around the corner.31 In recent years, perceptions of increased Chinese assertiveness, regional fears, and a muscular U.S. rebalancing effort toward the Pacific have increased concern among some observers that the region may be drifting toward rivalry and containment blocs. However, there is little evidence that East Asian states are engaged in an arms race, and few states are sending costly signals about their resolve to suffer the costs of war. The lessons and implications for power transition theory from late sixteenth and early seventeenth century East Asia are instructive for today. Indeed, being more aware of the nuanced view of power transitions leads to three observations about contemporary East Asian security.

#### No violent China rise, territorial conflict, or trade war

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What kind of world order will this bring? Contrary to what more alarmist voices have suggested, **a bipolar U.S.-Chinese world will** not be a world on the brink of apocalyptic war. This is in large part because China’s ambitions for the coming years are much narrower than many in the Western foreign policy establishment tend to assume. Rather than unseating the United States as the world’s premier superpower, Chinese foreign policy in the coming decade will largely focus on maintaining the conditions necessary for the country’s continued economic growth—a focus that will likely push leaders in Beijing to **steer clear of open confrontation** with the United States or its primary allies. Instead, the coming bipolarity will be an era of uneasy peace between the two superpowers. Both sides will build up their militaries but remain careful to manage tensions before they boil over into outright conflict. And rather than vie for global supremacy through opposing alliances, **Beijing and Washington will largely carry out their competition in the** [**economic**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-11-27/there-no-grand-bargain-china) **and** [**technological**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-10-19/can-pentagon-win-ai-arms-race) **realms**. At the same time, U.S.-Chinese bipolarity will likely spell the end of sustained multilateralism outside strictly economic realms, as the combination of nationalist populism in the West and China’s commitment to national sovereignty will leave little space for the kind of political integration and norm setting that was once the hallmark of liberal internationalism. WHAT CHINA WANTS China’s growing influence on the world stage has as much to do with the United States’ abdication of its global leadership under President Donald Trump as with China’s own economic rise. In material terms, the gap between the two countries has [not narrowed by much](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-09-21/stop-obsessing-about-china) in recent years: since 2015, China’s GDP growth has slowed to less than seven percent a year, and recent estimates put U.S. growth above the three percent mark. In the same period, the value of the renminbi has decreased by about ten percent against the U.S. dollar, undercutting China’s import capacity and its currency’s global strength. What has changed a great deal, however, is the expectation that the United States will continue to promote—through diplomacy and, if necessary, military power—an international order built for the most part around liberal internationalist principles. Under Trump, the country has broken with this tradition, questioning the value of free trade and embracing a virulent, no-holds-barred nationalism. The Trump administration is modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal, attempting to strong-arm friends and foes alike, and withdrawing from several international accords and institutions. In 2018 alone, it ditched the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the [nuclear deal with Iran](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-08-13/how-we-got-iran-deal), and the UN Human Rights Council. It is still unclear if this retrenchment is just a momentary lapse—a short-lived aberration from the norm—or a new U.S. foreign policy paradigm that could out-live Trump’s tenure. But the global fallout of Trumpism has already pushed some countries toward China in ways that would have seemed inconceivable a few years ago. Take Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who effectively reversed Japan’s relations with China, from barely hidden hostility to [cooperation](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2170436/china-japan-moving-competition-cooperation-leaders-say), during a state visit to Beijing in October 2018, when China and Japan signed over 50 agreements on economic cooperation. Meanwhile, structural factors keep widening the gap between the two global front-runners, China and the United States, and the rest of the world. Already, the two countries’ military spending dwarfs everybody else’s. By 2023, the U.S. defense budget may reach $800 billion, and the Chinese one may exceed $300 billion, whereas no other global power will spend more than $80 billion on its forces. The question, then, is not whether a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order will come to be but what this order will look like. At the top of Beijing’s priorities **is a liberal economic order built on free trade**. China’s economic transformation over the past decades from an agricultural society to a major global powerhouse—and the world’s second-largest economy—was built on exports. The country has slowly worked its way up the value chain, its exports beginning to compete with those of highly advanced economies. Now as then, these **exports are the lifeblood of the Chinese economy:** they ensure a consistent trade surplus, and the jobs they create are a vital engine of domestic social stability. There is no indication that **this will change** in the coming decade. Even amid escalating trade tensions between Beijing and Washington, China’s overall export volume continued to grow in 2018. **U.S. tariffs may sting**, **but they will neither change Beijing’s fundamental incentives nor portend a general turn away from global free trade on its part**. Quite to the contrary: because China’s exports are vital to its economic and political success, one should expect Beijing to double down **on its attempts to gain and maintain access to foreign markets**. This strategic impetus is at the heart of the much-touted [Belt and Road Initiative](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-24/why-democracies-are-turning-against-belt-and-road), through which China hopes to develop a vast network of land and sea routes that will connect its export hubs to far-flung markets. As of August 2018, some 70 countries and organizations had signed contracts with China for projects related to the initiative, and this number is set to increase in the coming years. At its 2017 National Congress, the Chinese Communist Party went so far as to enshrine a commitment to the initiative in its constitution—a signal that the party views the infrastructure project as more than a regular foreign policy. China is also willing to further open its domestic markets to foreign goods in exchange for greater access abroad. Just in time for a major trade fair in Shanghai in November 2018—designed to showcase the country’s potential as a destination for foreign goods—China lowered its general tariff from 10.5 percent to 7.8 percent. Given this enthusiasm for the global economy, the image of a revisionist China that has gained traction in many Western capitals is misleading. **Beijing relies on a global network of trade ties**, so it is loath to court direct confrontation **with the United State**s. Chinese leaders fear—not without reason—that such a confrontation might cut off its access to U.S. markets and lead U.S. allies to band together against China rather than stay neutral, stripping it of important economic partnerships and valuable diplomatic connections. As a result, **caution**, not assertiveness or aggressiveness, will be the order of the day **in Beijing’s foreign policy in the coming years**. Even as it continues to modernize and expand its military, **China will** carefully avoid pressing issues **that might lead to war with the United States, such as those related to the South China Sea, cybersecurity, and the weaponization of space**. NEW RULES? Indeed, much as Chinese leaders hope to be on par with their counterparts in Washington, they worry about the strategic implications of a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order. American leaders balk at the idea of relinquishing their position at the top of the global food chain and will likely go to great lengths to avoid having to accommodate China. Officials in Beijing, in no hurry to become the sole object of Washington’s [apprehension](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-02-13/china-reckoning) and scorn, would much rather see a multipolar world in which other challenges—and challengers—force the United States to cooperate with China. Chinese leaders worry about the strategic implications of a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order. In fact, the United States’ own rise in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provides something of a model for how the coming power transition may take place. Because the United Kingdom, the world’s undisputed hegemon at the time, was preoccupied with fending off a challenger in its vicinity—Germany—it did not bother much to contain the rise of a much bigger rival across the pond. China is hoping for a similar dynamic now, and recent history suggests it could indeed play out. In the early months of George W. Bush’s presidency, for instance, relations between Beijing and Washington were souring over regional disputes in the South China Sea, reaching a boiling point when a Chinese air force pilot died in a midair collision with a U.S. surveillance plane in April 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks a few months later, however, Washington came to see China as a useful strategic partner in its global fight against terrorism, and relations improved significantly over the rest of Bush’s two terms. Today, unfortunately, the list of common threats that could force the two countries to cooperate is short. After 17 years of counterterrorism campaigns, the sense of urgency that once surrounded the issue has faded. Climate change is just as unlikely to make the list of top threats anytime soon. The most plausible scenario is that a new global economic crisis in the coming years will push U.S. and Chinese leaders to shelve their disagreements for a moment to avoid economic calamity—but this, too, remains a hypothetical. To make matters worse, some points of potential conflict are here to stay—chief among them [Taiwan](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2018-07-27/storm-brewing-taiwan-strait). Relations between Beijing and Taipei, already tense, have taken a turn for the worse in recent years. Taiwan’s current government, elected in 2016, has questioned the notion that mainland China and Taiwan form a single country, also known as the “one China” principle. A future government in Taipei might well push for de jure independence. Yet a Taiwanese independence referendum likely constitutes a redline for Beijing and may prompt it to take military action. If the United States were to respond by coming to Taiwan’s aid, a military intervention by Beijing could easily spiral into a full-fledged U.S.-Chinese war. To avoid such a crisis, Beijing is determined to nip any Taiwanese independence aspirations in the bud by political and economic means. As a result, it is likely to continue lobbying third countries to cut off their diplomatic ties with Taipei, an approach it has already taken with several Latin American countries. Cautious or not, China set somewhat different emphases in its approach to norms that undergird the international order. In particular, a more powerful China will push for a stronger emphasis on national sovereignty in international law. In recent years, some have [interpreted](https://www.ft.com/content/67ec2ec0-dca2-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce) public statements by Chinese leaders in support of globalization as a sign that Beijing seeks to fashion itself as the global liberal order’s new custodian, yet such sweeping interpretations are wishful thinking: China is merely signaling its support for a liberal economic order, not for ever-increasing political integration. Beijing remains fearful of outside interference, particularly relating to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and [Xinjiang](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-06-20/reeducation-returns-china), as well as on matters of press freedom and online regulations. As a result, it views national sovereignty, rather than international responsibilities and norms, as the fundamental principle on which the international order should rest. Even as a new superpower in the coming decade, China will therefore pursue a less interventionist foreign policy than the United States did at the apex of its power. Consider the case of Afghanistan: even though it is an open secret that the United States expects the Chinese military to shoulder some of the burden of maintaining stability there after U.S. troops leave the country, the Chinese government has shown no interest in this idea. Increased Chinese clout may also bring attempts to promote a vision of world order that draws on ancient Chinese philosophical traditions and theories of statecraft. One term in particular has been making the rounds in Beijing: wangdao, or “humane authority.” The word represents a view of China as an enlightened, benevolent hegemon whose power and legitimacy derive from its ability to fulfill other countries’ security and economic needs—in exchange for their acquiescence to Chinese leadership. BIPOLARITY IN PRACTICE Given the long shadow of nuclear escalation, **the** [**risk of a direct war**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option) **between China and the United States will** remain minimal, even as military, technological, and economic competition between them intensifies. Efforts on both sides to build ever more effective antimissile shields are unlikely to change this, since neither China nor the United States can improve its antimissile systems to the point of making the country completely impervious to a nuclear counterattack. If anything, the United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty will encourage both sides to build up their nuclear forces and improve their second-strike capabilities, ensuring that neither side will be confident it can launch a nuclear attack on the other without suffering a devastating retaliation. The threat of nuclear war will also keep Chinese tensions with other nuclear-armed powers, such as India, from escalating into outright war. Proxy wars, however, cannot be ruled out, nor can military skirmishes among lesser states. In fact, the latter are likely to become more frequent, as the two superpowers’ restraint may embolden some smaller states to resolve local conflicts by force. Russia, in particular, may not shy away from war as it tries to regain its superpower status and maintain its influence in eastern Europe and the Middle East. Faced with calls to reform the UN Security Council, fraying powers such as France and the United Kingdom may seek to buttress their claim to permanent membership in the council through military interventions abroad. In the Middle East, meanwhile, the struggle for regional dominance among Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia shows no signs of abating. Across the globe, secessionist conflicts and terrorist attacks will continue to occur, the latter especially if competition between China and the United States reduces their cooperation on counterterrorism measures. China’s emphasis on national sovereignty, together with Western societies’ turn away from globalism, will deal an additional blow to multilateralism. In the economic realm, export-driven economies, such as China, Germany, and Japan, will ensure the survival of a global liberal trade regime built on free-trade agreements and membership in the World Trade Organization—no matter what path the United States takes. On other matters of global governance, however, cooperation is likely to stall. Even if a future U.S. administration led a renewed push toward multilateralism and international norm setting, China’s status as a junior superpower would make it difficult for the United States to sustain the strong leadership that has traditionally spurred such initiatives in the past. Differences in ideology and clashing security interests will prevent Beijing and Washington from leading jointly, but neither will have enough economic or military clout to lead on its own. To the extent that multilateral initiatives persist in such a world, they will be limited to either side’s respective sphere of influence. China’s emphasis on national sovereignty, together with Western societies’ turn away from globalism, will deal an additional blow to multilateralism. The European Union is already fraying, and a number of European countries have reintroduced border controls. In the coming decade, similar developments will come to pass in other domains. As technological innovation becomes the primary source of wealth, countries will become ever more protective of their intellectual property. Many countries are also tightening control of capital flows as they brace for a global economic slump in the near future. And as concerns over immigration and unemployment threaten to undermine Western governments’ legitimacy, more and more countries will increase visa restrictions for foreign workers. Unlike the order that prevailed during the Cold War, a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order will be shaped by fluid, issue-specific alliances **rather than rigid opposing blocs** divided along clear ideological lines. Since the immediate risk of a U.S.-Chinese war is vanishingly small, **neither side appears willing to build or maintain an extensive**—and expensive—**network of alliances**. China still avoids forming explicit alliances, and the United States regularly complains about free-riding allies. Moreover, neither side is currently able to offer a grand narrative or global vision appealing to large majorities at home, let alone to a large number of states. For some time to come, then, **U.S.-Chinese bipolarity will not be an ideologically driven, existential conflict over the fundamental nature of the global order**; rather, it will be a competition over consumer markets and technological advantages, playing out in disputes about the norms and rules governing trade, investment, employment, exchange rates, and intellectual property. And rather than form clearly defined military-economic blocs, most states will adopt a two-track foreign policy, siding with the United States on some issues and China on others. Western allies, for instance, are still closely aligned with the United States on traditional security matters inside NATO, and Australia, India, and Japan have supported the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, these states still maintain close trade and investment relations with China, and several of them have sided with Beijing in trying to reform the World Trade Organization. This two-track strategy shows just how far down the road to bipolarity the world has already advanced. And the fundamental driver of this process—the raw economic and military clout on which American and, increasingly, Chinese dominance rests—will further cement Beijing’s and Washington’s status as the two global heavyweights in the coming decade. **Whether or not the United States recovers from its Trumpian fever and leads a renewed push for global liberalism is**, ultimately, of little consequence to the outcome: **opposed in their strategic interests but evenly matched in their power, China and the United States will be unable to challenge each other directly and settle the struggle for supremacy definitively**. As during the Cold War, each side’s nuclear warheads will prevent proxy conflicts from easily escalating into a direct confrontation between the two superpowers. More important still, **China’s leadership is** acutely aware of the benefits **its country derives from the status quo**, for now—**it is chief among the conditions for China’s continued economic and soft-power expansion**—**and will** avoid **putting these** benefits on the line anytime soon, unless China’s core interests are in the balance. Chinese leaders will therefore work hard to avoid setting off alarm bells in already jittery Western capitals, and their foreign policy in the coming years will reflect this objective. **Expect recurring tensions and fierce competition, yes, but** not a descent into global chaos.

#### Interdependence solves Thucydide’s Trap

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The Harvard University political scientist Graham Allison coined the phrase “Thucydides Trap” to express that a rising power (Athens, in his analogy) inevitably comes into conflict with the existing dominant power (Sparta). With the United States today the existing dominant power, China, the rising power, might seem to be stepping into a Thucydides Trap. But Sparta and Athens had little economic interconnection, while there have never been two large economies as entwined as China’s and America’s. Factory workers in the upper Midwest complain about how commerce with China disadvantaged them, and they have a point, but that commerce has not only reduced poverty for vast numbers, it may prevent the utter calamity of the United States and China going to war. No scenario can be imagined in which combat between China and the United States does not ruin the economies of both. Norman Angell would argue that the Chinese have already come to this conclusion and already are determined to avoid the Thucydides Trap. Other than NASA’s International Space Station, the most expensive engineering endeavor in history is the South-North Water Transfer Project, a $90 billion mega-aqueduct under construction to solve China’s freshwater crunch. This magnificently fashioned system of canals, sluices, and pumps could be rendered worthless in a few hours by America’s overwhelming air power. Chinese leaders endorsed the project because they believe war with the United States will not happen. American leaders should believe that too.

#### Antitrust doesn’t solve innovation – its fine now and companies circumvent the aff’s standard

Disco ’21 [Project; 4/23/21; The Disruptive Competition Project; "It’s Not the Size of the Dog in the Fight, But the Size of the Fight in the Dog," https://www.project-disco.org/competition/042321-its-not-the-size-of-the-dog-in-the-fight-but-the-size-of-the-fight-in-the-dog/]

As the title says, the size of a company doesn’t stop that company from offering competitive products and should not determine the acceptability of any company’s actions to innovate. From small to large alike, any business is capable of producing innovative products and competing with the largest firms. However, certain firms have recently come under fire for their efforts, and although offering highly valued services by consumers and businesses alike, even take criticism for defending themselves.

Tech firms are constantly attempting to innovate and compete, often spending significant resources to lead in R&D in order to offer the best services they can, as the competitiveness of the tech industry is a more complicated subject than it may appear at first glance. Criticism aimed at larger tech companies often centers around their efforts to innovate in any sector, discussing their supposed “market power.” As DisCo has discussed in the past, clear assessments of markets, market power, and dominance can be quite difficult to achieve and have all long been points of discussion. [1, 2, 3, 4] Yet critics of “Big Tech” often reach their conclusions to break up companies or punish certain firms based upon oversimplified understandings of these concepts. For example, last July’s CEO hearing discussed a range of concerns voiced by policymakers, the most common of which was the perceived market dominance and abuse of power of the companies the witnesses lead. These conclusions do not reflect the actual state of these companies or competition.

Take Amazon’s new deal with the NFL as a recent example of a competitive move which is open to similar criticism as in last July’s CEO hearing on online platforms and market power. Amazon’s responses to questions for the record regarding content distribution shed light on certain misconceptions around competition in the tech sector. This deal makes Amazon Prime Video an exclusive partner for the NFL’s Thursday Night Football package from 2023-2033. This deal is meant to enhance Amazon’s free live sports programming. Amazon’s efforts through Amazon Prime Video are just one of a number of companies in the sector attempting to innovate and continue to capture consumers’ interest. The streaming market is a highly competitive and ever-shifting space, where many companies offer a host of unique offerings to viewers, cable has been in decline for some time now, and pay-TV just had its worst year ever. Consumers are reaping the benefits from firms such as Amazon offering these innovative new services.

Amazon’s size doesn’t stop it from innovating in the streaming market. Neither does Apple’s as it continues to pursue Apple TV+ content, or Netflix’s as it leads in nominations for this Sunday’s Academy Awards. In a recent WSJ article Netflix’s Scott Stuber, head of original films, expanded on Netflix’s growing desire to produce original movies and stated:

“Competition is good. It makes you sharper as an executive and it gives the artists a chance to find the right place in the market for their idea and get what they deserve for it.”

These services, in addition to the other firms competing in the streaming market, have provided, and continue to expand upon, a wealth of pre-existing and original content for consumers to enjoy. This constant drive towards innovation and competition is not unique to streaming. The tech industry as a whole is characterized by its pushes towards disruption and innovation, which necessarily propel the involved companies to grow, oftentimes exponentially. In a word, they become “big.”

Yet as is often the case, when larger companies take action to innovate, providing highly valued services to consumers, they receive criticism for it. Additionally, it’s becoming increasingly more common to see “swampetition” at play and it appears more companies are becoming targets of such actions based upon their size in the name of “consumer protection” or market correction. What masquerades as an attempt to address perceived inequalities present in the market is really the case that “firms that face serious competitive challenges in the market will turn to political economy, aiming to manipulate regulators into undermining an agile and disruptive competitor.”

There are clear positive effects that come from companies’ efforts towards innovation, no matter their size. The constant pursuit of innovation, often disruptive, by companies across a range of sectors sparks the development of new offerings and services and greater competition between firms which leads to benefits for consumers. “Bigness” by itself should not be an antitrust concern. Size does not preclude competition or innovation.

#### Liberal peace is inseparable from the violent façade of liberal pacification which obscures the escalating cycle of phenomenological violence at the heart of the world order that kills value to life and ensures nuclear war

Baron, et al, 19—Associate Professor in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University (Ilan Zvi, with Jonathan Havercroft, Associate Professor in International Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Isaac Kamola, assistant professor of political science at Trinity College, Jonneke Koomen, Associate Professor of Politics, Sociology and Women’s and Gender Studies at Willamette University, Alex Prichard, senior lecturer in International Relations at the University of Exeter, and Justin Murphy, anticlimactically just an independent scholar, “Liberal Pacification and the Phenomenology of Violence,” International Studies Quarterly (2019) 63, 199–212, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]

Phenomenology, as we are using it, is not about lived experience. It is the philosophical tradition of revealing different types of beings and things that contain meaning in our world, the structures and/or contexts in which they exist, and how these structures and contexts are meaningful. Understood in this way, violence is one of these structures and/or contexts. A phenomenological perspective does not approach violence from a particular normative position, although it does not preclude normative critique. A phenomenological approach does not treat violence as a discrete thing that one agent does to another, although it does not preclude such acts being described as violent. Instead, a phenomenological perspective adds to our intellectual and methodological toolbox by identifying violence as a condition or context in which people function. Phenomenology allows us to identify violence occurring in ways and in places that we otherwise would not be able to recognize. It does not change the meaning of violence (as harm, for example). Instead, it treats violence ontologically, enabling us to reveal more accurately the extent to which violence exists in the world.

From a phenomenological perspective, violence is often inconspicuous. Violence can function as a naturalized or internalized regime of compulsion or domination. Pacification reveals both the pervasiveness of violence and forms of violence that may otherwise remain inconspicuous. The erasing of tradition and the enforcement of particular legal codes at the expense of indigenous cultural norms is one example of an inconspicuous form of violence that involves conspicuous and inconspicous consequences (Cocks 2014). In understanding violence phenomenologically, as a structure of revealing across multiple worlds, we are better able to reveal the extent to which violence shapes our world and how we are then shaped by violence.

Pacavere

The Romans understood violence as a necessary condition for pax. The liberal imagination blinds itself to [obfuscates] the ways that pacification functions as violence in our world order. International relations scholarship’s strict distinction between peace and violence reinforces this obfuscation. Yet, the violence of (and in) pacification is central to the contemporary world. A phenomenological approach shows that moments of violent rupture are not aberrations of the world order. Violent outbreaks are breakdowns of pacification. It follows that multiple structures of the world order function as the violence of pacification, of pacavere.12 These structures include liberal capitalism, colonialism and the postcolonial aftermath, and war. Each functions as a key site of pacification. Anarchist thought reveals the pacification in liberal capitalism. Postcolonial thought reveals the pacification of colonial projects. Both anarchist and postcolonial thought demonstrate how war is a breakdown of pacification, revealing the hidden violent structures of our worldhood.

Anarchist critiques of capitalism, unlike Marxist and liberal interpretations, take seriously the decisive role of state violence in structuring society and markets. Anarchists view the state as an institution that sustains elite appropriations of political and economic power (Proudhon [1861] 1998; Sorel 1999; Prichard 2015). Those at the bottom of the social hierarchy bear the costs of this enforced order. The state diffuses violence (pacification) throughout the entire society—often in ways that go unrecognized by its subjects (Sorel 1999, 65). The naturalization of violence consolidates arbitrary regimes of domination in society. While specific, countable incidents of violence may decline, the social order is largely premised on the threat of violence for contravening social norms making specific, countable incidents of violence relatively rare (Kinna and Prichard, forthcoming).

Anarchist thinkers view rising inequality in the context of declining riots, insurgencies, and assassinations (see Figure 1) as evidence of pacification. Incidents of proletarian violence, anticolonial violence, riots, and protests are all examples of resistance to the “regimes of domination” that shape contemporary society, regimes easily identifiable by those subject to them (Gordon 2007, 33). Drawing on these accounts, we interpret declining rates of riots as a sign of increased pacification, rather than evidence that the system is becoming less violent. Conversely, eruptions of antistate and anticapitalist direct violence are signs of a breakdown in pacification. Much like Heidegger’s example of broken equipment (1962, 102–3, 412–13), which draws our attention to the background structures of our world, brief instances of direct violence reveal violently structured social relations.

Although the liberal imagination obscures the centrality of violence, violence has always been central to the liberal world order—to the liberal worldhood—particularly during the colonial and imperial projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Bell 2007a, 2007b). Colonial violence was diffused throughout the entire society, often in ways that went unrecognized by the colonized themselves. The violence of pacification structured the very existence of the colonized subject. This violence transformed the colonized subjects into a different “species” (Fanon 1963, 35– 40, 43). Colonial pacification was more than direct and indirect violence; it was sufficiently diffuse to remake the psyche of the colonized, affecting their mental health and emotions (Fanon 1963, 35–106). Fanon (1963, 31) described it as “atmospheric violence,” a “violence rippling under the skin.” Unable to lash out against the colonizer, the colonized lived everyday within a world ordered by violence. In this world, the colonized could not respond to the colonizers for fear of directly violent reprisals and would turn to symbolic activities such as a dance circle to expose the violence experienced on a daily basis (Fanon 1963, 57). For the colonized, rituals such as the dance were a means of expressing existential frustrations with and resistance to the violence of colonial pacification through reenactments of direct violence. Ultimately, anticolonial struggles exposed the violence of colonialism by directing that violence back on its authors.

Practices of colonial rule were central to developing liberal norms of sovereignty, as well as to the domination and control of recalcitrant populations whether within Europe, such as the English domination of the Welsh, Irish, and Scots, or outside of Europe by settler colonialists against indigenous populations (Deloria Jr 1974; Anghie 2005; Miller 2006; Havercroft 2008; Shaw 2008; Barkawi and Stanski 2012; Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014; Lightfoot 2016; Rueda-Saiz 2017). This civilizing imagination functioned phenomenologically. It produced insiders as civilized and peaceful and outsiders as violent, external threats to civilization. In doing so, this imagination successfully obscured how the structures of liberalism produced colonial violence.13

FOOTNOTE 13 Arguments about the foundational role of colonialism, primitive accumulation, and white supremacy in structuring the modern international system are particularly useful in thinking about phenomenological violence (Jones 2006; Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015; Du Bois 1915; Shaw 2008; Coulthard 2014; Deloria 1974; Lowe 2015; Hartman 1997). The legacy of these practices pervades contemporary liberal peace-building (Richmond 2014; Sabaratnam 2015; Bouka 2013; Autesserre 2009) and liberal global governance (Koomen 2014a, 2014b, 2013), while trade liberalization can facilitate mass violence (Kamola 2007; Smith 2016). Césaire argues that colonialism produced a “boomerang effect” within European societies; Nazism was the return of violence previously “applied only to non-European peoples” (Césaire 2000, 36). At independence, international law became a mechanism for reinforcing this international order upon the previously colonized world (Grovogui 1996).

The idea of war as an external practice of states, not tied to their internal workings and located according to specific normative projections of Western identity, followed from this colonial mentality. This mentality legitimized the exporting of violence to create a Western imperial pax

and was so widespread that it shaped the development of modern warfare (Ellis 1986; Proudhon [1861] 1998). The colonial wars reproduced and reinforced ideologies of Western superiority, evidenced in part by the West’s superior military technology. A consequence of this racist hubris was the inability to foresee the destructive tendencies of Western warfare when unleashed against themselves (Ellis 1986).

The discipline of international relations, founded in response to the unexpectedly destructive character of the First World War, reproduced this understanding of war.14 This understanding disguises the possibility of increasing violence within the liberal world by presuming a historical narrative of progress and being shocked by its aberration. War, however, is not the absence of peace or an aberration of liberal progress, but is instead a phenomenological breaking of the liberal worldhood.15

Once a liberal order of democracy, free markets, and international institutions are spread throughout the world, liberal ideology imagines peace as the end state. Yet, states often deploy war under liberal guises.16 Wars under the aegis of humanitarian values and regime change are examples of the multifaceted character of liberal pacification. Liberal regimes emphasize the violence of those that they are invading, while minimizing the violence involved in these military undertakings and the violence necessary to sustain the liberal societies themselves. What Pierre-Joseph Proudhon called “the moral phenomenology of war” (Prichard 2015, 112–34; Proudhon [1861] 1998) becomes an integral part of the everyday workings of society that shape innumerable aspects of our daily language. The upshot is that, within liberal ideology, the violence committed by liberal states is justified, whereas the violence committed by illiberal states is not.

Postcolonial and anarchist scholarship focuses on the incorporation of violence in the production of liberal spaces (Barkawi and Laffey 1999). These same concerns can be directed onto the liberal order itself. Seen from the perspective of marginalized and oppressed populations, the structures of liberal pacification take on a distinctly violent aspect. The liberal world is not less violent. Rather, the liberal world involves a sophisticated phenomenological process of legitimating certain types of violence in order to render other types of violence invisible.

Liberal Pacification

What does it mean to apply this third type of violence to our understanding of international relations? Pacification reveals liberalism as a violent process as opposed to a system that is emblematic of the absence of direct violence. There are parallels between the Pax Britannia, Pax Americana, and the ancient peace of the Pax Romana (Neocleous 2010, 13). However, our account emphasizes the crucial role of pacification as a distinct kind of violence in maintaining these pacific orders. Our theory offers the novel insight that incorporating pacification into the analysis of the liberal peace reveals crucial aspects of this peace that conventional and critical accounts neglect.

A focus on pacification provides three critical insights. First, it recovers the crucial role of pacification in the historical founding of the liberal order. Second, by distinguishing between three kinds of violence (Figure 2), we account for the empirical observations of the liberal peace as leading to a decline in direct violence and an increase in violence overall as part of the pacification of the Pax Americana. Conversely, the liberal version of the Pax Americana cannot account for key anomalies. Third, our approach draws attention to the violent ordering of social relations. This dimension of violence is neglected even in Marxist, postcolonial, neo-Gramscian, and post-structuralist critiques of the liberal peace, which primarily focus on the role of direct and indirect violence in maintaining the Pax Americana.

Contemporary liberal international relations theory emphasizes the nonviolent role of the liberal triad (democracy, free markets, and institutions) in causing the liberal peace. Yet, a quick review of the history of liberalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that key figures in liberalism, from John Stuart Mill, to Joseph Galliéni, to American foreign policy elites, understood pacification as a necessary step in establishing and maintaining the liberal order

Mill, one of the philosophical founders of liberalism, conceptualized and deployed liberalism as a domination strategy. Mill argued that it is appropriate to impose despotism or slavery on “savages” who incline to “fighting and rapine,” but the government should use force as little as possible:

What they require is not a government of force, but one of guidance. Being, however, in too low a state to yield to the guidance of any but those to whom they look up as the possessors of force, the sort of government fittest for them is one [that] possesses force, but seldom uses it. (Mill 1998, 232–33)

In terms of our conceptual distinction, Mill argued that liberalism as pacification was a more effective instrument of violence than the direct modes of violence that governments usually deploy.

The history of European colonialism is replete with this line of reasoning. “[L]iberal improvement” was a regular plank of colonial strategy by France and Britain in the nineteenth century (Owens 2015, 154). Consider one example from the French colonial tradition. Galliéni, a military commander and administrator, consciously deployed liberalism as a domination strategy in the pacification of Tonkin during the 1890s. Galliéni’s strategy involved slowly spreading military outposts and deploying civil administrators to create markets, schools, and amenities. The rationale was that locals would gain a personal interest in the continuation of French control and would help to quell Chinese brigandage. “Piracy,” said Galliéni, “is the result of an economic condition. It can be fought by prosperity” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). Galliéni devised a “theory of pacification” in which “the correct combination of force and politics can socialize, pacify, and domesticate a population into regulating itself” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). What Mill proposed in theory, Galliéni enacted in practice; pacification—the violent reordering of social relations in a colony—was a more effective means of maintaining liberal rule than the deployment of direct violence.

While less explicit, the relationship between liberalism and imperialism remained present in the twentieth-century development of the Pax Americana. During this era, US policy makers sought to construct a zone of peace distinct from the zones of war associated with authoritarian regimes. The US State Department first recognized the concept of “hegemonic pacification” in the Euro-Atlantic conference diplomacy of the 1920s (Cohrs 2008, 619). The United States’ “strategic restraint” in the aftermath of World War Two was motivated by this concept of liberal, hegemonic pacification (Ikenberry 2009; Ikenberry 2011, 173). US defense officials Stimson, Patterson, McCloy, and Assistant Secretary Howard C. Peterson agreed that it was a matter of the security interests of the United States to maintain “open markets, unhindered access to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much—if not all—of Eurasia along liberal capitalist lines” (Leffler 1984, 349–56; Barkawi and Laffey 1999). Liberalism as a domination and pacifying strategy continued throughout (and long after) the Cold War (Laffey 2003; Stokes 2003), as evident in one of the founding documents of the post–World War Two liberal order, NSC-68 (Ikenberry 2011, 168). While the enforcement of a Pax Americana eventually yielded a decline in direct violence, it produced an increase in other types of violence. The first insight of our theory is that pacification has always been part of the liberal project and that the violence in the liberal project never went away.

The second insight is that by reinterpreting the liberal peace as liberal pacification we are able to grant the empirical findings of liberal peace theorists while maintaining that the Pax Americana represents an intensification of violence overall. In the language of positivist social science, our theory is observationally equivalent to that of liberal peace theory. We expect that the quantity of direct violence inversely associates with the degree of pacification in a society. Therefore, our interpretation challenges research that identifies liberal institutions as the cause of declining violence. Liberal institutions, as apparatuses of liberal pacification, ensure that direct violence is increasingly rare while leaving the structures of violence and domination in place. The observational equivalence on particular dependent variables (in our case, all forms of direct violence) produces a theoretical change requiring the generation of novel observable implications (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 30).

Furthermore, increased suffering in liberal societies provides evidence contradicting the main claims of liberal peace theories, while remaining consistent with liberal pacification. At its core, liberalism is a project that tries to maximize the utility of its subjects (in other words, minimize suffering while maximizing happiness). As such, a state of liberal peace should lead to a decrease in markers of suffering. However, there is more slavery in the world today than ever before, with conservative estimates of between 12.3 and 27 million people in debt bondage, chattel, or contract slavery (Gordon 2012).17 Moreover, there is ample evidence of rising psychological disorders in liberal societies. A preponderance of evidence from the United States suggests that depression, anxiety, alienation, opioid dependency, stress, other related psychological disorders, increased social isolation, and the decline of community have increased throughout the twentieth century (Twenge, Zhang, and Im 2004, 320; Adler, Boyce, Chesney, et al. 1994; Twenge 2000; Twenge, Konrath, Foster, et al. 2008; Twenge, Gentile, DeWall, et al. 2010; Cohen and Janicki-Deverts 2012; American Society of Addiction Medicine 2016). Changes to human life associated with modernity have caused psychological stress to increase (Jackson 2014). Mortality rates have increased for some white, non-Hispanics aged 45–54 in the United States between 1999 and 2013 (Case and Deaton 2015). Modern technological advances from television to the Internet may contribute to increasing separation and alienation of the social human animal into individualized bodies connected by increasingly weak and empty bonds (Putnam 2000; Gray 2011; Turkle 2011). At minimum, new information communication technology such as Facebook can increase the stress and anxiety of its users (Lee-Won, Herzog, and Park 2015). The violent structuring of liberalism enables increases in social alienation, anxiety, stress, and human bondage through repression, economic control, and social isolation.

These are not isolated instances of suffering. They are fundamental structural features of our liberal world. If liberalism is a process of pacification rather than simply peace, then this rise in individual suffering in liberal spaces may be evidence of a similar process that Fanon equated with the psychic life of the colonist. Just as Fanon’s colonial subjects, unable to lash out at the settler through direct violence, internalized their suffering, modern liberal subjects, unable to resist liberal pacification, internalize their suffering (1982, chap. 6; cf. Sorel 1999, 118). Liberal peace should bring about a rise in happiness; that it has instead led to rising suffering is evidence of liberal pacification.

Third, in addition to offering an alternative interpretation of the liberal peace, our theory of liberal pacification supplements key insights from critical approaches to peace. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey’s work on imperial processes and liberal spaces makes a similar point to ours, that the celebrated zone of liberal peace rests on practices of violence (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 2002; cf. Neocleous et al. 2013). Their account, however, focuses on practices of direct violence, such as humanitarian interventions against authoritarian regimes or corporations hiring local militias to make work sites in the global south safe for economic extraction (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 422). Our point is that these moments of direct violence lead to pacification wherein social relations have been so violently reordered as to make direct violence no longer necessary. Once direct violence has established liberal space, pacification functions as a structure of violence that sustains the space. Direct violence only manifests itself when pacification weakens.

Pacification, however, does not merely operate through manipulating the conscience of its subjects. While Marxist and Gramscian concepts of ideology and hegemony are consistent with our theory of pacification (Peceny 1997, 418), they do not address how the constructed political order sustains itself through a violent reordering of social relations. A Gramscian-inspired critique of the democratic peace can yield a bird’s-eye view of the ways in which liberal peace theory is itself deployed as an ideological tool (Ish-Shalom 2006, 569–75). However, Gramscianinspired approaches do not account for the ways that everyday practices of violence (for example, surveillance technologies, implied threats from weapons, security barriers, etc.) sustain liberal pacification. While ideational factors are important in pacification, these factors rest upon practices and structures that are of an ontological-existential character. To review, our reinterpretation of the liberal peace as liberal pacification offers three novel insights. First, liberal scholars and others associate the development of the liberal order with peace and a decline in violence by ignoring how pacification is part of the liberal project. Second, the empirically observed decline in violence equated with the liberal peace is not necessarily a sign of human progress but could be a sign of intensified repression or increases in other forms of suffering across the liberal world order. Third, our concept of pacification reveals violence that is neither direct nor indirect but is phenomenologically structured into the world order. Understanding liberalism as pacification produces a paradigm shift. Liberal pacification is violent in the sense that it coerces a specific type of liberal docility, while also preventing types of resistance that might be understood as violent, including riots, insurrections, civil wars, and interstate wars. Pacification reveals the ongoing violence at the heart of a political project that imagines itself to be against violence.

Conclusion

Our account of pacification recovers a crucial aspect of pax, one originally etched into Roman monuments. The heading of the Res Gestae (the funeral monument to Emperor Augustus) reads, “[t]his is how he [Augustus] made the world subject to the power of the people of Rome” (Beard 2016, 364). This monument does not celebrate peace as the absence of violence; it celebrates pacification. Pax takes the form of a process that violently reorders the world so that imperial subjects are rendered incapable of using violence to resist Roman rule. The absence of overt acts of violence depends upon the maximization of pacification.

The practice of pacification includes threats, coercion, intimidation, and surveillance to restructure and sustain social and political relations. When this type of violence operates effectively, it appears as the absence of violence; pacification’s violence resides in the structuring of the prevailing order. While such an outcome may appear peaceful, it entails, at best, a negative peace that operates through a violent and coercive reordering of society.

Liberal peace advocates measure direct violence and equate the decline in that kind of violence with peace. However, our claim is that the spread of liberal institutions does not necessarily decrease violence but transforms it. Our phenomenological analysis captures empirical trends in human domination and suffering that liberal peace theories fail to account for, including increased inequality, slavery, anxiety, addiction, and anomie. Our analysis also highlights how a decline in direct violence may actually coincide with the transformation of violence in ways that are concealed, monopolized, and structured into the fabric of modern liberal society. If our theory is correct, we will find increases in markers of suffering as society liberalizes. While we cannot say whether these indicators are unique to pacified liberal societies, it is significant that they are rarely, if ever, discussed in terms of violence and the liberal peace.

Liberal pacification is observationally equivalent to liberal peace. This is not a semantic argument. Liberal peace advocates claim that processes that promote individual freedom and autonomy (that is, democracy, free markets, and global institutions) cause peace. While the restructuring of the global order—pacification—reduces direct violence, it also restructures social relations in ways that are violent. Declines in directly observable violence render other forms of violence invisible as violence; in fact, insidious, coercive, and violent systems of military deterrence and compellence, nuclear terror, surveillance, and intimidation constitute the worldhood of the liberal order.

### K

#### Auctions DA- the rhetoric of “extinction outweighs” and “black people are affected too” operates as an advertisement of black death to be traded for the master’s fantasy. Weighing their impacts is the attempt to make the slave into the human and sustain the project of US colonialism.

**Kumavie 20** [Delali Kumavie, Postdoctoral Fellow at Mahindra Humanities Center at Harvard University, Propter Nos Vol. 4 (2020), “The Reinvention of the Slave”, pg. 8-12, JMH]

This slave auction monument, which itself reads, “SLAVE AUCTION BLOCK: On this site, slaves were bought and sold,” is situated adjacent to the historic courthouse building where the founding fathers, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe all had their offices. After an earlier plaque, which was affixed to an exterior wall at eye level, mysteriously disappeared, a bronze plaque was embedded in the pavement to replace it. After Allen removed this plaque, Parks created a handmade sign for the empty space. Parks’ plaque read: “Human auction site: In 1619 the first African kidnap victims arrived in V.A. Buying and selling of humans ended in 1865. For 246 years this barbaric trade took place on sites like this.” There is a strange irony in replacing one form of representation for another. Whereas the first monument keeps vague the temporal markers of slavery, Parks’ plaque, by proclaiming an end to slavery in 1865, creates a teleological narrative arc which identifies a beginning and end to slavery. It affirms the myth that emancipation ended slavery, allowing the inheritors of slavery’s capital to be absolved of any obligations or complicity. It leaves out the many ways that the systemic and structural economy of slavery continues under other guises in Charlottesville, the United States, and the world at large.

It is as a response to this temporally bounded understanding of slavery that Calvin Warren avers that slavery is an “event-horizon that expresses itself in endless disguise, through a time outside of duration—black time.”14 Warren’s understanding that slavery cannot be bounded within a linear temporal logic because it possesses an “unsettling lifespan” that is “continually regenerated, reborn, and reincarnated” elucidates why Parks’ **attempts at memorialization fails to grapple with slavery’s ongoing presence at the site of the auction block, in Charlottesville and beyond.15** Attempts to memorialize slavery too often remain caught in a time-trap that insists on beginnings and ends. These pitfalls into “continuity and progression” cannot comprehend as Saidiya Hartman does in “The Time of Slavery” when she writes, “then and now coexist; we are coeval with the dead.”16

On the right side of the Du Bois’ color line, Parks acts out his powers of invention to trap the slave in a temporal prison by seeking to replace the word ‘slave’ with something else. By striking through ‘slave’ and writing ‘human,’ Parks intends to acknowledge the biological symmetry between the enslaved Africans who arrived and continued to arrive by boat or through birth, after the shipload that docked in Jamestown, Virginia in 1619, with their white masters. It also sentences the ‘slave’ to history, to a past event that has an identifiable endpoint in 1865. Needless to say, slavery continued in various forms well after 1865 throughout the Atlantic world and beyond, creating a system of hierarchy where “the black person mirrored for the society what human being was not.”17 Park’s periodization of slavery from 1619 to 1865 acts as a kind of temporal hold that limits the mutations of slavery and its afterlives and skips over the structurally enforced oppression that slavery created and the state sustains.

By replacing or writing above the word ‘slave’ with ‘human,’ Parks reanimates what he intended to erase, or more precisely strikethrough. **This act resonates with Derrida’s early concept of “sous rature” which is, according to Spivak, “the mark of the absence of a presence, an always already absent present, of the lack at the origin that is the condition of thought and experience”** (xvii). **The ‘slave,’** despite Parks’ attempts at writing above and/or writing over it**, is still present, and part of the matrix of meaning that is entailed in ‘human.’** Indeed, to use another Derridean term, the word ‘human’ acts as a supplement to ‘slave,’ it interrupts, intervenes, and replaces, yet its meaning cannot be disentangled from ‘slave’. The supplement, as a concept, emerges in Derrida’s interpretation of Rousseau's understanding of writing as a supplement for speech and is described by Derrida as an addition, a “surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence.”18 The supplement, according to Gerasimos Kakoliris, also “shelters another meaning whose cohabitation with the first is both strange and necessary.”19 Kakoliris further elaborates that in order for the supplement to function as a substitute, it must “resemble in some essential way that which it replaces.” 20 ‘Slave’ and ‘human’ are conceptually entangled as a supplement. While the ‘slave’ designates a lack that is present in ‘human,’ or that which exists at the boundary of the ‘human,’ it is essentially through the act of distilling the black slave from the white human that the borders between them conceptually are laid out. **If ‘slave’ denotes and connotes a category that is not quite “human,” a commodity, a means of socio-economic stratification, it nonetheless still bears a resemblance that makes the supplement possible.**

The alterity that is asserted by Frantz Fanon’s repetition of the moment of identification when the white child exclaims, “Look! A negro!” is an affirmation of the slave’s difference. In Fanon, the acts of “looking” and “seeing” constitute a creationary passage where the black body is formed within the epistemological and structural apparatuses that must be harnessed and reinforced to keep the status quo.21 Something similar happens when Parks, looking at the word ‘slave,’ sees therein the brutalized beings whose labor undergirds a place like Charlottesville. But Parks cannot reconcile his perception of the slave with the ‘human.’ He rationalizes that by replacing the ‘slave’ with the ‘human,’ he has somehow reclaimed, reinvented the slave as a human, and has done a public service. Instead of applauding Parks, we should instead put pressure on this reinvention.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines the verb form of the word “invent” as to “come upon, find, discover.” “Invent” can also mean to “devise something false or fictitious; to fabricate, feign, ‘make up’” or to “originate, introduce, or bring into use formally or by authority.” Invention is an agential right of the sovereign that is often assumed by those belonging to a dominant race within a global racial hierarchy that permits them to enact such inventions on subjugated race. With Parks’ authorial imposition on the slave auction block through his revisioning practices, he reinvents by renaming the ‘slave’ as ‘human.’ He acts out the necessity to invent; an impulse which at an earlier time was entwined with “discovery” as in when Columbus discovers the new world and proceeds to categorize indigenous people as “idolators,” and the sixteenth-century invention of Man that was enabled by the parallel invention of what Sylvia Wynter refers to as “the untrue Other of the Christian self” or “Man’s human Others.”22 These acts of invention continue to exist in various permutations—in the science that permitted and legalized slavery and colonialism, and most spectacularly in the murder of black people by the police in the United States.23 Fundamental to these acts of invention is race, which is its own kind of invention. In interrogating the relationship between race and psychology, Hortense Spillers argues that ““race” is not simply a metaphor and nothing more; it is the outcome of politics.”24 Further, Spillers describes race as a “complicated figure” that “demonstrates the power and danger of difference, that sign and assigns difference as a way to situate social subjects.”25 If a system of race and its mutations did not exist, Spillers argues, then “we would need to invent them.”26 **Invention thus becomes its own kind of division, one that distinguished between those who by their imagined and structurally enforced racial dominance act to ‘discover’ and shape those others.** This divide is perhaps what Spillers alludes to when she says earlier in the same essay, ““race” is destiny in the world we have made.” 27 In other words, race is an invention necessary to rationalize Western systems of domination and brutality. However, Parks’ reinvention by reinforcing a liberal, color-blind gesture that, in asserting the equality of slaves with humans, fails to grapple with the true quality of racism and antiblackness. I focus on Allen and Parks action not to call them out or shame them. Rather their actions, I believe, are emblematic of the growing trend of Americans trying to grapple with becoming anti-racist without understanding the limitations and inadequacies of some of these practices and attempts.

**The unintended, nonetheless provocative, result of his striking through slave was to authorize through inscription that the term ‘slave’ denotes something or someone other than ‘human’**. On the one hand, Parks unintentionally re-emphasizes that the ‘slave’ is distinct from, perhaps even excised from the category of the human—socially dead, subject to gratuitous violence, and natal alienated.28 On the other hand, **Parks assumes that being human is universal without considering the ways that black humanity, as Zakiyyah Iman Jackson puts it, “is burdened with the specter of abject animality” and thus “assimilation into the category of “universal humanity” should not be equated with black freedom.”**29 The representational apparatus that Parks mobilizes attempts to thrust upon the enslaved a humanity from which they are always already excised. By canceling out and later replacing ‘slave’ with ‘human,’ Parks constricts to the past the conditions of the ‘slave,’ leaving only its trace in the “human.” In other words, what Parks and Allen do not realize is that the human is not universally applicable.30 At the site of the slave auction block the limits of representation means that ‘human’ can only act as a supplement to ‘slave’ because that site remains marked by slavery and its many afterlives. The auction block is a site that denotes the “marketing” of black flesh, as Katherine McKittrick points out, and it is not restricted to a singular location.31 It was not limited by any circumference, surface area, or monument. It is “a singular location that is shaped by, and shapes, multiple spatial differentiations.”32 Allen’s two-yearlong continuous return to the slave auction block culminated in the removal and replacement of the monument with one made by Parks. Recently, this sign has been replaced by another homemade plaque that strikes through with red ink the two mentions of ‘slave’ on a copy of the original plaque and replaces one with ‘Human’ and the other with “people.” Thus, there is a presumed fixity of the auction block that Allen displays in his obsession with the fixed plaque of the slave auction block, especially since slaves were sold in both public and private contexts on varying forms and kinds of auction blocks.33 As the visible marker of a form of exchange that could, in theory, have taken place anywhere, Allen concentrates on this marker of the past solely, instead of the many markers of the present that evidence the ongoing socio-economic exchange value that the state and its people place on black people’s daily lives. In Charlottesville, as in other U.S. towns and cities, such markers include housing inequality, unequal access to health care, and school zoning practices that separate the wealthier, predominantly white neighborhoods from the working-class black ones.34

#### Quote from Mubirumusoke 21.

**It’s hard to imagine that “social death” is all there is to black life—and it should be noted neither Wilderson nor Sexton ever make such a claim and acknowledge that indeed black people are more than the living dead.**

#### We straight McCarthy

Kelley, 15—Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Beyond Black Lives Matter,” Kalfou, Vol. 2, Iss. 2, (Fall 2015): 330-337, dml)

This implicit appeal to acknowledge us-to recognize our humanity, our dignity, and our right to live-is understandable in a world where the statesanctioned killing and caging of Black bodies is routine. But as George Lipsitz observed, such appeals are embedded in a humanist logic that emphasizes "interiority" and feeling, thereby elevating "the cultivation of sympathy over the creation of social justice."7 That is to say, our feelings of empathy in any representation of suffering are designed to be understood and individually felt rather than transformed into collective praxis. This is partly why concepts like reparations are so antithetical to modern liberalism. Given the trauma produced by an endless video loop of Black people dying at the hands of police officers who are almost never indicted, let alone prosecuted and convicted, collective healing and the cultivation of sympathy are to be expected. On one hand, this makes the movement's counterslogan, "All Lives Matter," all the more offensive and painful. "All Lives Matter" is heard and felt as a belittling or decentering of anti-Black racism. It trades on postracial myths of equivalency in suffering. On the other hand, sometimes we react to "All Lives Matter" with such hostility that it stands in as an unambiguous expression of anti-Black racism. Can we salvage these words? Don't we want to build a world in which every life is valuable, cherished, and sustained? Are we not seeking a world that recognizes multiple sites of dispossession and recognizes that state violence inside US borders is inseparable from US militarism around the world? The fact that we are compelled to a defensive position is a consequence of focusing on proving our value rather than critiquing the system that devalues all of us and destroys the world in the process.

The veracity of our humanity was never the issue-then or now. The problem lies with Western civilization's very construction of the human. As Sylvia Wynter, Cedric Robinson, Aimé Césaire and others have been saying for decades, the "Negro" was an invention, a fiction-like that of the Indian, the Oriental, the "Mexican," etc. Or in Frantz Fanon's oft-quoted line from The Wretched of the Earth: "It is the colonist who fabricated and continues to fabricate the colonized subject."8 Indeed, the entire structure of global white supremacy depends on such inventions, like the fictions of the Arab as non- or anti-Western and the "Immigrant" as essentially Latino/a, or the notion that indigenous people (in North America at least) are all dead. This is why we have such a hard time acknowledging that most so-called immigrants from Mexico and Central America are, in fact, indigenous.

The very foundations of Western civilization were built on such fabrications and enacted through violence. Once they crumble, so goes Western civilization's conceit as well as the massive philosophical smokescreen that enables (racial) capitalism-the greatest, most destructive, most violent crime wave in history-to masquerade as the engine of progress, a pure expression of freedom and liberty, the only path to human emancipation. The modern world that invented the Negro, the Oriental, the Indian, and the Savage as a means of inventing European Man was built on the theft of humans, theft of land and water, indiscriminate murder, violation of customary rights, moral economy, enclosure of the commons, destruction of the planet-outright lawlessness, justified by supposed rationality or what Weber might call instrumental rationality. To leave it at Black Lives Matter unintentionally conceals the crime. After all, these were the very processes that birthed the liberal humanism to which BLM activists seem to appeal.

In his book Forgeries of Memory and Meaning, Cedric Robinson further elaborates on the systems of racial maintenance and myth making, the "racial regimes" responsible for the inventions of the Negro (the Indian, the Oriental) and their relation to capital. What exactly are racial regimes? In Robinson's words, they "are constructed social systems in which race is proposed as a justification for the relations of power." The power is real and formidable but surprisingly unstable. For Robinson, "the covering conceit of a racial regime is a makeshift patchwork masquerading as memory and the immutable. Nevertheless, racial regimes do possess history, that is, discernible origins and mechanisms of assembly. But racial regimes are unrelentingly hostile to their exhibition."9 In other words, to say that anti-Blackness is foundational to Western civilization is not to say that it is fixed or permanent. On the contrary, it is incredibly fragile and must be constantly remade; it is epiphenomenal to the production of Blackness-which is an essential component of modern racial regimes, but not its totality. In the last century alone, racial regimes have been remade, reconfigured, destabilized, and consolidated many times, employing new technologies to circulate old racial fabulations and new fictions in the process of capitalist expansion.

Proving one's humanity will not uproot racial regimes, for the very evidence of our humanity is their raison d'etre. Our exploitation is evidence of our value, but it requires enormous intellectual, juridical, and psychic resources to conceal our humanity. Slavery was not just social death, but was based on a cost-benefit analysis that assumed the disposability of Black lives. The system of extracting surplus emerged within a logic of racial hierarchy and racial subjugation that dragged Africans, Asians, and Europeans proletarianized by enclosure to the lands of the Americas, Oceania, parts of South Asia and Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean-where indigenous people were dispossessed, enslaved, or exploited by other means. Enclosure is yet another example of theft and violence masking as "law, order, security": backed by the rule of law, the state employs violence to discipline, to reclassify, to criminalize, and to destroy sovereignty and create disorder. Enclosure is part of this process of war-a war on the commons, which ultimately turns some of the expropriated people into a proletariat (including European industrial, maritime, and landless rural labor, as well as prostitutes and beggars), turns a portion into settlers, and sends a portion to the workhouse. Some are merely casualties whose flesh mingles with the earth and whose bodies-sometimes hanging from a tree or broken on the wheel-serve to terrorize those who resist the new discipline.10

While the value of Black labor may have ebbed and flowed with the changing character of the global economy, there has never been a moment in US history when our humanity mattered, when Black people could enjoy full privileges and protections of citizenship. But the same can be said of most of the planet-at least until the mid-twentieth century, although I would venture to say this is still the case. What Black resistance calls into question is the inhumanity of the system, the inhumanity of those who subjugate in the name of civilization; it insists that the survival of humanity (and this is not the humanity defined by the Enlightenment) depends on the complete destruction of racial capitalism, patriarchy, and regimes of normativity.

As I wrote in the aftermath of the George Zimmerman verdict, unless we come to terms with this history, we will continue to believe that the system just needs to be tweaked, or the right-wing fringe defeated, or our humanity acknowledged.11 We will miss the routine character of state violence; its origins in the very formation of colonialism, slavery, and capitalism; and the ways in which routine violence has become a central component of US policies, including drone warfare and targeted killing. We cannot change the situation simply by finding the right legal strategy, the best policies, or recognition.

#### Yes spill up- Our analysis of the failures of their speech act is a best starting point to understand how blackness is constantly relegated to the slave signifier.

**Marriott 21** [David Marriott, Professor in the Histories of Consciousness at UC Santa Cruz, 2021, “Lacan Noir, Lacan and Afro-pessimism”, The Palgrave Lacan Series, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-74978-1#authorsandaffiliationsbook>, Pages 4-6, JMH]

Good or authentic psychoanalysis means both the subject as signifier and the signifier as subject. Good psychoanalysis is as opposed to a sociology of values as it is to pragmatist or utilitarian approaches**. Good psychoanalysis signifies the differential element of the unconscious from which the value of the good itself derives**. **Good psychoanalysis thus means structure or topology, but also jouissance or speech at the origin**. Good psychoanalysis also means knowing that we are all “slave[s] [serf] of language”, and that representation is the “illusion” which the signifier serves [répond à]—these are truly foundational and critical elements (E, 414). But, understood in this way, good or authentic psychoanalysis also means that we are all irredeemably enslaved as speaking subjects. But why assume that being human pertains to universal enslavement, and why presume that the signifier is joined to slavery? (E, 416) What knowledge or ignorance is encoded in such rhetorical figures? And what does this say of psychoanalysis as the institution that puts slavery to work, to borrow a metaphor from Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams, as the form of testimony? And what possible remedy (aside from becoming an analyst) could there be to a slavery that begins from the moment it (ça) speaks? **Hence Lacan’s emphasis on the constant slippage of speech, its failure, as against its imaginary fullness**. And hence the theory of the analytic institution that subtends it: as neither a church nor faith, with a doctrine ruling over both of them, but an I that founds itself as an act of pure sacrifice, and one that thereby destroys all law and authority. However, an act that claims to see with the eyes of faith and to know—with absolute conviction or knowledge—belief from unbelief is all the more enslaved for doing so. **For the knowledge of illusion does not thereby free you from illusory knowledge. And doubting the existence of one’s chains does not automatically lead one to mastery or wisdom.** Hence the controversy over Lacan’s substitution of the authorization of the analyst for that of the institution. Tat Lacan’s dissolution of his own school in 1980 has been criticized as an attempt to kill all heirs, and in a purely authoritarian manner should perhaps not be surprising. A power that absolute, it has been said, could only see its fulfilment in absolute servitude.6 But what then does it mean to still bear witness to Lacanianism as a training in, and a theory of, authorization? And what did the dissolution accomplish if not further proof of the ante-legum power of the master-signifier? Lacan contrasts mastery with knowledge, slavery, or the signifier with the imaginary (in its illusory servitude). The tendency will be towards ever greater formalization, and the bias towards ignorance-as-testimony will see the beginning of “ab-sens”, that is the analysis of what cannot be spoken, though it can still be signified. The algorithm will therefore soon be followed by mathemes and by knots; but the slavery of which reason knows nothing will remain “ab-sens”, and our illusory commitment to knowledge, in whose allegiance we declare our freedom, will harden into a knot that binds us ever tighter to chains (of signifcation). The word chain takes us back to slavery, but a slavery without black people. The links of the chain are compared to necklaces, not to iron collars or bits; Borromean knots not to nooses. But **regardless of the rhetoric used, slavery is at the heart of what Lacan perceives to be our identifications. This is also what analysis is: the authorization through testimony of our slavery by the signifier. To confuse liberation with “ab-sens”; this is what Lacan feels as one of the continuous temptations held out to us by representation.** Psychoanalysis is not a re-presentation of what we do not yet know but the active expression of what is missing from symbolization; darstellung and not vorstellung, the presentation of an “ab-sens”, of a lack without which neither sense, nor object or subject could be imagined. Tis way of presenting is that of the Lacanian analyst precisely because he or she wields the signifier’s diferential element as critic and creator and therefore as a real encounter. But once again the experience of “ab-sens” is assumed to be universal, formal. And white. Lacan says that his adversaries confuse transference with the imaginary vicissitudes of the ego. **Lacan has high expectations of this conception of the signifier as subject: a new organization of the clinic, a new organization of technique, a new determination of psychoanalytic truth and knowledge. But what remains unsaid—unthought—is the very whiteness of this thought**. For why does the ça appear here as both a slavish fiction (of a reason forever deprived of its sovereignty) and a rhetorical apostrophe to slavery as the only knowledge of what it means to be human? **It is from this little dungeon that I would like to see blackness emerge**. That is to say: emerge insofar **as we are able to distinguish slavery from a certain conformity of thought by which psychoanalysis expresses difference, and to that end challenge the way it conceives of blackness and at the same time excludes it.** More, I believe that Lacan’s work allows us to investigate these exclusions and precisely because he does not look at them (do we see only what we know?) because they are devoid of meaning. Since we in our turn do not want to put blackness to work as a particular form of being or identity, we share this limitation although we would also like to know what is being concealed by it and what is being obscured by its failed psychoanalysis. Thus the ultimate question: why is blackness so much harder to see and can it be seen without being hidden? Indeed, that is how black studies is being conceived in this book, the better to understand why this indifference of psychoanalysis—in its absolute ignorance—is its most symptomatic expression. This book is written, then, out of a certain distrustful love of Lacan. It should therefore be read as a work that tries to grasp—without ever reaching—that which slips away, or that which does not seem to exist beyond its indifference. Limited in every respect but aware of its limitations: perhaps there is an origin and image here of a certain black reading?

#### Lesion, pharmacological, and deep brain stimulation studies provide empirical neurological support for psychoanalysis

Dall’Aglio 19 [John Dall’Aglio, Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University. Developmental Psychosomatics Laboratory, New York State Psychiatric Institute/Columbia University Medical Center.] “Of brains and Borromean knots: A Lacanian meta-neuropsychology” Neuropsychoanalysis, Vol. 21, 2019 (<https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2019.1619091>) – MZhu

Affective consciousness and the real

Recall the concept of the real as a negativity (non-representational insistence) which is present from the beginning. Das Ding emerges simultaneously with understanding yet is outside of it (Freud, 1895). Reason (or cognition, understood as a symbolic-imaginary function) cannot represent, and thereby cannot comprehend, the real. In this way, the limit of reason is within reason (Copjec, 2012; Laplanche, 2011).

Therefore, neural areas corresponding to the real should be constitutive of, but not identical with, cognitive functions. As non-representational, they should insist their presence through affect and the compulsive repetition of the drive. At the core of the subject, the real is also at the core of cognition, while simultaneously the limit of that cognition.

The drive (iteration, source/pressure) refers to the real (Johnston, 2013). Freud (1915a) defined drive as:

a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative of stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body. (Freud, 1915a, pp. 121–122)

Drive, thereby, refers to the demand upon the mind concerning bodily needs. In the brain, the brainstem and diencephalon contain “need-detectors.” Each has a homeostatic set-point – for example, the ideal amount of salt to have in the blood. The hypothalamus and related systems closely monitor and modulate the internal body (see, for example, Waterson & Horvath, 2015; Williams, Harrold & Cutler, 2000; Woods, Seely, Prote, & Schwartz, 1993). These areas can be dynamically localized as important points of proximity between the body and the mind, and the locus of the pressure of the drive (Solms, 2013).

These diencephalic and upper brainstem systems are fundamentally affective (Panksepp, 1998; Solms, 2013). Deviations from set-points produce unpleasure, whereas moving towards the set-point generates pleasure. One major structure is the periaqueductal gray (PAG), which receives projections from these brainstem areas. Stimulation of the ventral columns of the PAG induces feelings of extreme pleasure, whereas stimulation of the dorsal columns corresponds to feelings of excruciating pain. Here, one finds the pleasure principle as a key dynamic in the process of maintaining homeostasis (Solms & Turnbull, 2002).

Importantly, this affective system is fundamental to consciousness, the feeling state of being. Disturbances to upper areas of the brain disrupt cognitive and emotional functions, but the subject retains affective being (Penfield & Jasper, 1954). For example, hydranencephalic patients are born with little-to-no cortex but intact subcortical affective circuits (Merker, 2007; Shewmon, Holmes, & Byrne, 1999). These patients are still conscious in the affective sense and respond to the environment through these circuits. Summarizing these various lines of evidence, Solms (2013) argues that consciousness can exist without cortex.

However, damage to these affective circuits significantly impairs consciousness (along with cognition). In fact, a lesion to the PAG completely wipes out consciousness, extinguishing affective being. This supports the critical role of the upper brainstem in the generation of consciousness (Moruzzi & Magoun, 1949), which leads Solms (2013) to conclude that affective consciousness is the bedrock of consciousness. Later cognitive functions of the cortex depend upon and are shaped by the affective circuits which function prior to them (Panksepp, 1998; Solms & Turnbull, 2002).

With its (extimate) relationship with the internal body via homeostasis and drives, the upper brainstem and associated structures correspond functionally to Freud’s id. In contrast, the cortical focus on exteroception corresponds to Freud’s ego. Since the upper brainstem is intrinsically conscious (i.e. its activity generates the affective bedrock of consciousness) and the cortex is dependent on the brainstem for consciousness, Solms (2013) argues that the id is fundamentally conscious. Rather than the nucleus of the unconscious, the id is the font of consciousness.

More specifically, the id (upper brainstem and associated structures) is affectively conscious. It generates being as a feeling state without representation. Through a Lacanian lens, this affective consciousness corresponds to the insistence of the real. It is non-representational, a primary affect (Lacan, 1997). It is beyond (indeed, prior to) cognition – constituting a limit, an impasse. Furthermore, as the bedrock of consciousness, it is constitutive of cognition. This fits well within Lacan’s conception of the real and the drive (Johnston, 2013a).

Affective instincts

Additionally, affective consciousness extends into the limbic system. Panksepp (1998) identifies seven affective systems: SEEKING, RAGE, PANIC, PLAY, CARE, LUST, and FEAR.7 Across mammals, they exhibit the same circuitry, neurotransmitters, and stereotyped motor functions (see Panksepp, 1998 for neuroanatomical details). A combination of lesion, pharmacological, and deep brain stimulation studies supports the dynamic localization of their functions.

SEEKING closely resembles the Freudian libidinal drive (Solms, 2012a). It is an objectless, volitional system that carries its own subjective quality of excitatory pleasure (as opposed to a reduction of tension). The rest of the circuits are more specialized. For example, RAGE characterizes the aggressive impulse to destroy that which frustrates the subject’s goals. PANIC activates in response to separation from a loved object, connoting separation-anxiety. Generally speaking, all seven systems generate a distinct response to an experience of the external world.

Furthermore, these experiences also concern socio-emotional needs, such as attachment needs in the PANIC system (Solms, 2012b). These limbic circuits qualitatively elaborate upper brainstem affective consciousness through distinct socio-emotional needs. These affective instincts prepare the organism to interact with the world and meet its needs, albeit in a rough-and-ready way (Solms & Turnbull, 2002).

Insofar as these affective instincts are prepared for certain types of experiences, I would suggest that they are not the real proper and are better localized at the intersection of the real and the imaginary. Nevertheless, they also have built in “holes” – the potential to acquire new objects. For example, the FEAR system has certain built-in objects (such as a fear of falling). However, it also has the potential to learn new objects, such as electrical outlets. This potential is never exhausted, for these areas are subject to neuroplasticity (Ansermet & Magistretti, 2007; Solms & Turnbull, 2002). I suggest that these seven affective instincts might be considered “highways” from the real to the symbolic-imaginary. Similarly, Verhaeghe (2004) highlights Panksepp’s (1998) instincts as potential neurobiological underpinnings in the child’s turn to the Other (symbolic-imaginary registers) to answer the pressure of the drive (the real).

These instincts contrast with the upper brainstem homeostatic drives. Each instinct represents a socio-emotional need. In the perspective of drive as representative of bodily need (i.e. located in brainstem and diencephalon “need-detectors”), there is not much flexibility in terms of what objects might satisfy the drive. Only water can satisfy the demand made upon the mind when dehydrated, for example. However, affective instincts are more flexible – emotional needs may find any number of objects.

Therefore, the flexibility attributed to the psychoanalytic drive (i.e. alteration, the aim and object) corresponds with the plasticity and potentiality of these affective instincts. In contrast, the brainstem, corresponds to the real of the drive (i.e. iteration, the source and pressure). Indeed, drive itself is split – here, neuro-structurally and evolutionarily, for the affective instincts are more evolutionarily recent than the upper brainstem (Solms & Turnbull, 2002). For Lacan, the tension of the drive is never eliminated. SEEKING corresponds best to this notion of excitatory pleasure in the drive, for it is innately objectless (Solms, 2012a). However, this inexhaustibility may be attributed to all seven affective instincts.

# 1NR – NDT r1 – Emory PR

## K

### 1NR – Impact Calc

#### They say irreversibility----Extinction framing occludes material differences between the valuation of different subject positions, which leaves civil society as a determinant of value unthought.

Smith, 16—Assistant Professor Department of Religion, La Salle University (Anthony, “Fabulation, or Non-Philosophy as Philo-Fiction,” *Laruelle: A Stranger Thought*, Chapter 6, pg 125-129, dml)

When one engages in critical theory around the question of race, it is not uncommon for well-meaning individuals to ask whether it is truly anti-racist to recognize and name another person as raced in any way whatsoever. Race is, after all, a fiction, or what Laruelle would call a hallucination of the (lived) human. So is it right to engage with that fiction, when it has driven some of the most sadistic violence imaginable against other human beings? Would it not be better, such a well-meaning individual will ask, to drop this fictional account and treat all human beings simply as human beings? Does not such treatment arise out of a refusal to recognize racial difference or distinction? It may even seem as if such a ques-tion is grounded upon strong non-philosophical commitments to the generic nature of the (lived) human. The reality, as can be derived already from the preceding two chapters, is very different. Laruelle's theory is interesting precisely because of its strangeness to standard liberal conceptions of politics, ethics, and aesthetics. Such liberal accounts, even when they are radical liberal accounts, are largely dependent upon a philosophy of recognition and representation played out between two terms that occludes a third term which determines that relationship. This is another way of saying, of course, that such a philosophy manifests the structure of Philosophical Decision, but it surfaces in a different way why there might be something of Philosophical Decision to resist and struggle against. The occluded third term of Philosophical Decision may come to oppress or control in nefarious ways the other two terms, and it is naturalized or normalized in such a way as to be beyond criticism.

How does this abstract structure relate to the question of insist-ing on a certain set of names as privileged fictional names for the Human-in-Human that lies beyond naming? With regard to the way the fiction of race manifests in the world, the two terms could be many things, but if Wilderson and others are correct that there is something fundamental to the construction of race that is rooted in the systematic dishonoring and subjugation of Black people by white people, then it would not simply be correct to say these two terms are "white" and "nonwhite." It is more rigorous to name them as white and Black, for the way in which race is constructed ultimately depends upon these two extreme poles. While in the past such a relationship was dependent upon a recognition of "not black," as the white human secured his humanity in not being a slave (that is, in not being nothing), this has changed in an age of "color-blind racism" or "racism without racists."' Now the demand is that the Black and white poles be recognized simply as two people, and that they enter into mutual recognition based upon some basic commonality. This is often what lies behind the refusal to take into account very different material conditions for a white subject and a Black subject. While segregation of communities continues, this is thought to arise "naturally," ignoring the ways in which Blacks and whites have very different access to business and housing loans or health care or education, or any number of other institutions that correspond to quality-of-life indicators. The demand is that one strip away various determinations of one's subject position so that recognition takes place simply between two people, instead of between a victim and her oppressor or one complicit with making her a victim. What is left unthought, occluded from vision altogether, is that there is an implicit whitening of what it means to be human here. There is a third term - what we might name as the anti-black world since it englobes the other two - that determines the relationship of the two. One does not see the world, for the world is the name for that framework through which you see everything else and you do so seemingly spontaneously. To be a recognizable person, entering into a relationship of good faith with another person, is to enter into certain conditions of the world. In simple terms, when the demand is to "treat people like people" this means ignoring the ways in which the world determines who gets seen as a person and who is not extended that privilege. It ignores that the demand is to see the person in the way one sees a white subject. Others have discussed at length Laruelle's valoriza-tion of cosmic blackness and they have done so with skill.' They tell us that Laruelle valorizes and names the blackness of the uni-verse because it is more generic than light, it is less than light - as a visual metaphor within philosophy, which has social conse-quences, it is valued less than light and thus it is named and cel-ebrated by non-philosophy. From the universe to the breaks in the social world, it is blackness that names the radically lived and unrepresentable.27

The subject position of the black is created by the world, and one names that blackness precisely because of the way in which the world has attempted to construct that subject as socially dead. Of course, from a non-philosophical perspective too, humans should all be treated as equal. But until the world that constitutes their inequality is ended, then one names these subjects either as Black, or victim, or (as we will see) Christ, because the (socially) dead may rise and in so doing disrupt the very world that brought about their death. This is how Laruelle understands victims. Not as weak and in need of saving, but as a fiction — as a subject — that is produced in a relative way by the world but that manifests a radical imma-nence that breaks from the dialectics of the world:

By its intrinsically in-person real, the victim is the counter-witness to nihilism, the same way that before it was the counter-example to creation ex nihilo. The victim carries with it resurrection, or rather the prior-to-the-first insurrection, against the dialectic of being and nothingness, which has no teal or lived sense. The victim is a power of "awakening" or "reprise" in the order of the lived experiences opposed to the simple dialectical or differential repetition of survival. Survival reinforces transcendence, an act that exceeds death or persecution and prolongs the world, whereas insurrection, which is the root of resurrection, weakens or debases this transcendence of a world to the state of lived experience.28

**Embracing extinction as a narrative—not biological—phenomenon is a prerequisite to disrupting white desires**

**Schotten, 18**—Associate Professor of Political Science and an affiliated faculty in Women's and Gender Studies, University of Massachusetts-Boston (C. Heike, “SOCIETY MUST BE DESTROYED,” *Queer Terror: Life, Death, and Desire in the Settler Colony* pg 108-111, dml)

How, then, to articulate and effect the radical abolitionism of revolutionary desire without getting caught up in the stranglehold of futurism? Futurism’s inescapability means **not simply that politics is irredeemable** and **reform insufficient**, but also that the deconstructive or queer practice of **subversive redeployment** is a **naïve delusion** regarding our own ability to **think** and **act outside** or **beyond futurist mandates**. As Edelman simultaneously argues and demonstrates, futurism’s **stifling determination** of the very domain of the political itself means that **any** and **all resistance is always already coopted**, while revolt is an impossibly queered space that is simultaneously named and foreclosed by the death drive. Yet Edelman’s solution to this dilemma is to recommend neither **capitulation** to futurism nor some sort of **compromise** with it but rather an **accession to its worst nightmares** in an embrace of queerness that will **destroy it from within**, “shortcircuit[ing] the social in its present form.”74 In other words, rather than **defend** society, which Edelman finds indefensible, much less **deconstruct** society, as a queer critique of norms might recommend, or even (dear me!) **redeem** society, by **entreating a utopian vision** that imagines the overcoming of all suffering and oppression, Edelman instead declares we must **destroy society**. And we do so by **taking up**, **inhabiting**, or “**embracing**” the very “**death**” that futurism **inevitably produces** as the queer by- product of its social ordering. He thus **dismisses utopianism** in the name of an **immediacy** that “**the future stop here**,”75 challenging us to live life as an **insistent presentism** that will **do nothing else afterward but die**, and casting this alliance with death as the **act of revolutionary resistance**.

While Dean vociferously rejects this “embrace” because of its psychoanalytic impossibility, Edelman, I think, is well aware of this fact and recommends it precisely for this reason, a contradiction that becomes more intelligible if understood politically rather than solely psychoanalytically. Indeed, Edelman’s recommendation of this “embrace” is a clearly political position— despite what he may say otherwise— in two specific, complex ways. First, recall the historicization of Edelman’s argument provided in chapter 2, wherein I characterized his version of “politics” as a distinctly modern, European, settler colonial sovereignty. An important consequence of this historicization is that, even in his allegedly non- or antipolitical advocacy, Edelman **cannot actually be rejecting politics per se** since, despite his own claims to the contrary, there is **no such thing**. Abolishing modern politics or futurist politics is **not equivalent to abolishing politics as such** and could only mean as much if **every modernity were European modernity**, if **every politics were a sovereign biopolitics**, and if **every temporality were futurist**. To understand Edelman’s refusal of politics as a **refusal of any and all politics existing anywhere** is to **go along with** his unmarked **universalist presentation of** reproductive **futurism** as the **logic of everything existing everywhere all the time**, itself a frequent conceit of psychoanalytic frames.76 But if futurism is the **temporality of modern biopolitical sovereignty**, it **immediately becomes clear that other temporalities are possible**, even as other versions of politics **must necessarily exist**.77 As Audra Simpson argues, for example, “Indigenous political orders are quite simply, first, . . . **prior** to the project of founding, of settling, and as such **continue to point**, in their persistence and vigor, to the **failure of the settler project to eliminate them**, and yet are subjects of dispossession, of removal, but their polities serve as **alternative forms of legitimacy** and **sovereignties** to that of the settler state.”78

Historicizing futurist politics in this way means that alternative temporalities or political schemas **exist** but are queer(ed) and **represented as existential threats** to it: as **unintelligible**, **unlivable**, **immoral**, **backward**, and “**savage**.” While Edelman does indeed conflate all politics with futurism, such that his call for the destruction of politics seems to portend an unthinkable and intolerable nihilism, it is nevertheless the case that, once situated historically, the advocacy that queers **accede to the deathly positioning** to which they are always already relegated by reproductive futurism is **not some sort of unthinkable**, **antipolitical vision**, nor is it an **advocacy of suicide** or **some sort of necropolitical imperative**. Rather, in the context of a **European modernity** built on the colonization of most of the rest of the world, Edelman’s embrace of death can be read as a **prescription** for an **anticolonial allegiance to** and **alliance with those forms of politics** and **temporality that thwart**, **refuse**, or **deny futurism’s colonial mandates**. No Future’s embrace of the “death drive,” in other words, is a **championing of resistant futures** and **political systems** that **show up as death from a futurist perspective** and are various surrogates for the broad, structural category he designates as “queer.” In advocating for a revolution on behalf of queers and arguing for an embrace of queerness, then, Edelman is very much arguing in the name of something— not the future, of course, and certainly not life in any biological sense. But he is also **not quite arguing in the name of death in a biological sense**, either. Rather, he is arguing that “the dead” should “live,” that is, that they “come to life” (or insistently exist) and **animate the destruction of the settler order** that they are always already **consigned by that social order to symbolize**. This is, in other words, an argument for indigenous existence as resistance to settler sovereignty. Siting and situating futurism historically make clear that Edelman’s recommended accession to queerness/death is another name for radical resistance to sovereign biopolitics and that, **far from nihilism**, it is an **emancipatory** and **decolonizing political recommendation** of the first order. In this sense, even Edelman’s own project is wedded to life, albeit a life that is unlivable as life, which is the status of native life within settler colonial regimes. As he says in recommendation of embracing the death drive, “political self- destruction inheres in the only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future in the name of having a life.”79 Edelman’s opposition to the political can therefore be reread as a **wholesale opposition** to the sovereign biopolitics of European modernity and an **imagining of the death of that political order** as the **content of revolutionary politics**. Indeed, his suggestion of a necessary “counterproject”80 to futurism makes clear that his recommendation of this refusal is the **essential**, **necessary**, and **definitive act of political resistance**, even as it is a **championing of the lives** and **political temporalities** of those **determined to be emissaries of death**.

Importantly, this destructive refusal is a threat that redounds back on Edelman himself and on **all of us who share** his **habitation of futurist politics** in Western modernity (or who were ourselves **trained in the history of that thought**). This is the second, complex way that Edelman’s rejection of politics is in fact a **maximally political entreaty**. The tension at work in Edelman’s inevitably futurist call to end futurism means that he is also and necessarily calling for the destruction of his own revolutionary project and subjective/authorial position. This is a queer revolution that **queers the aims of revolution itself**, divesting itself of futurism even as it speaks in its name. As a political act, it amounts “to **put[ting] one’s foot down at last**, **even if doing so costs us the ground on which we**, **like all others**, **must stand**.”81 It is a revolutionary desire that seeks to dispossess revolution of its failed foundations without thereby relinquishing either revolution or its animating desire. This revolutionary discourse exceeds the parameters of revolution as it has hitherto unfolded in modernity, even as it promises a liberation from modernity’s— and liberation’s— moralizing constraints.

This paradoxical, queer(ed) revolution is therefore **unmistakably tied to death**, and in more than one way: not only because queerness is the structural position of anything antisociety and antilife; not only because it **demands the destruction of all that has been construed as life** (as **valuable life**, as **worthy life**, as life **worth living** and **endowed with a future**); but also because the revolutionary call to destroy society and its futurist temporality will **necessarily result in the eradication of its own revolutionary demand in the process**. This is why Edelman’s queer political project **can never recommit us to sovereignty**, whether of a charismatic revolutionary leader, a vanguard revolutionary class, or a theological vision of an allpowerful monarch, much less the **sovereign subject**, whose **very European coherence requires futurism’s linear temporality**. It can commit us **only to the destruction of these things**, as well as to the **eradication of our own commitments precisely to that very destruction** if, as, and when they **threaten to become the next crushing futurist ideal**. Edelman’s formulation of the **impossible** yet **wholly revolutionary goal** of refusing futurism— a refusal achievable only in a future that lies beyond its textual articulation and summary rejection there— offers a **rich** and **provocative articulation** of a revolutionary desire that seeks to **dispossess revolution of its very foundations**, even as it speaks in its name.

## Case

#### Economic wars are impossible to predict.

Laio 19 Jianan Liao, Shenzhen Nanshan Foreign Language School. [Business Cycle and War: A Literature Review and Evaluation, Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, Volume 68, International Symposium on Social Science and Management Innovation, https://download.atlantis-press.com/article/55913122.pdf]

Through the comparison of the two views, it can be found that both sides are too vague in the description of the concept of business cycle. According to economists such as Joseph Schumpeter, the business cycle is divided into four phases: expansion, crisis, recession, recovery. [12] Although there are discords in the division and naming of business cycle, it is certain that they are not simply divided into two stages of rise and recession. However, as mentioned above, scholars who discussed the relationship between business cycle and war often failed to divide the business cycle into four stages in detail to analyze the relationship.

First, war can occur at any stage of expansion, crisis, recession, recovery, so it is unrealistic to assume that wars occur at any particular stage of the business cycle. On the one hand, although the domestic economic problems in the crisis/recession/depression period break out and become prominent in a short time, in fact, such challenge exists at all stages of the business cycle. When countries cannot manage to solve these problems through conventional approaches, including fiscal and monetary policies, they may resort to military expansion to achieve their goals, a theory known as Lateral Pressure. [13] Under such circumstances, even countries in the period of economic expansion are facing downward pressure on the economy and may try to solve the problem through expansion. On the other hand, although the resources required for foreign wars are huge for countries in economic depression, the decision to wage wars depends largely on the consideration of the gain and loss of wars. Even during depression, governments can raise funding for war by issuing bonds. Argentina, for example, was mired in economic stagflation before the war on the Malvinas islands (also known as the Falkland islands in the UK). In fact, many governments would dramatically increase their expenditure to stimulate the economy during the recession, and economically war is the same as these policies, so the claim that a depressed economy cannot support a war is unfounded. In addition, during the crisis period of the business cycle, which is the early stage of the economic downturn, despite the economic crisis and potential depression, the country still retains the ability to start wars based on its economic and military power. Based on the above understanding, war has the conditions and reasons for its outbreak in all stages of the business cycle.

Second, the economic origin for the outbreak of war is downward pressure on the economy rather than optimism or competition for monopoly capital, which may exist during economic recession or economic prosperity. This is due to a fact that during economic prosperity, people are also worried about a potential economic recession. Blainey pointed out that wars often occur in the economic upturn, which is caused by the optimism in people's mind [14], that is, the confidence to prevail. This interpretation linking optimism and war ignores the strength contrast between the warring parties. Not all wars are equally comprehensive, and there have always been wars of unequal strength. In such a war, one of the parties tends to have an absolute advantage, so the expectation of the outcome of the war is not directly related to the economic situation of the country. Optimism is not a major factor leading to war, but may somewhat serve as stimulation. In addition, Lenin attributed the war to competition between monopoly capital. This theory may seem plausible, but its scope of application is obviously too narrow. Lenin's theory of imperialism is only applicable to developed capitalist countries in the late stage of the development capitalism, but in reality, many wars take place among developing countries whose economies are still at their beginning stages. Therefore, the theory centered on competition among monopoly capital cannot explain most foreign wars. Moreover, even wars that occur during periods of economic expansion are likely to result from the potential expectation of economic recession, the "limits of growth" [15] faced during prosperity – a potential deficiency of market demand. So the downward pressure on the economy is the cause of war.

### Link---2NC

### 1NR – Atanasoski

#### Racial capitalism culminates in constant war, interventions, and the super exploitation of blackness in the name of profit.

**Burden-Stelly 20** [Charisse Burden-Stelly, Assistant Professor of Africana Studies and Political Science At Carelton University, July 1, 2020, “Modern U.S. Racial Capitalism”, EBSCOhost, Pages 8-10, JMH]

Drawing on the intellectual production of twentieth-century Black anticapitalists**, I theorize modern U.S. racial capitalism as a racially hierarchical political economy constituting war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, and labor superexploitation.14** The racial here specifically refers to Blackness, defined as African descendants’ relationship to the capitalist mode of production—their structural location—and the condition, status, and material realities emanating therefrom.15 It is out of this structural location that the irresolvable contradiction of value minus worth arises. Stated differently, Blackness is a capacious category of surplus value extraction essential to an array of political-economic functions, including accumulation, disaccumulation, debt, planned obsolescence, and absorption of the burdens of economic crises.16 At the same time**, Blackness is the quintessential condition of disposability, expendability, and devalorization.** My operationalization of capitalism follows Oliver Cromwell Cox’s explication in Capitalism and American Leadership. 17 Modern U.S. racial capitalism arose in the context of the First World War, when, as Cox explains, the United States took advantage of the conflict to capture the markets of South America, Asia, and Africa for its “over-expanded capacity.”18 Cox further expounds upon this auspicious moment of ascendant modern U.S. racial capitalism thus: By 1914, the United States had brought its superb natural resources within reach of intensive exploitation. Under the stimulus of its foreign-trade outlets, the financial assistance of the older capitalist nations, and a flexible system of protective tariffs, the nation developed a magnificent work of transportation and communication so that its mines, factories, and farms became integrated into an effectively producing organism having easy access to its seaports.… [Likewise,] further internal expansion depended upon far greater emphasis on an ever widening foreign commerce.… Major entrepreneurs of the United States proceeded to step up their campaign for expansion abroad. The war accentuated this movement. It accelerated the growth of [modern] American [racial] capitalism and impressed upon its leaders as nothing had before the need for external markets.19 Relatedly, Peter James Hudson argues that the First World War fundamentally changed the terms of order of international finance, allowing New York to compete with London, Paris, and Berlin for the first time in the realm of global banking. This was not least because the Great War “drastically reordered global credit flows,” with the United States transforming from a debtor into a creditor nation.20 In addition to Latin American and Caribbean nations and businesses turning to the United States for financing and credit, domestic saving and investment patterns were altered to the benefit of imperial financial institutions like the City Bank.21 Although the United States is, to use Cox’s terminology, more a “lusty child of an already highly developed capitalism” than an exceptional capitalist power, the nation perfected its techniques of accumulation through its vast natural wealth, large domestic market, imbalance of Northern and Southern economies, and, importantly, through its lack of concern for the political and economic welfare of the overwhelming masses of its population, least of all the descendants of the enslaved.22 **Modern U.S. racial capitalism is thus sustained by military expenditure, the maintenance of an extremely low standard of living in “dependent” countries, and the domestic superexploitation of Black toilers and laborers**. Cox notes that Black labor has been the “chief human factor” in wealth production; as such, “the dominant economic class has always been at the motivating center of the spreads of racial antagonism. This is to be expected since the economic content of the antagonism, especially at its proliferating source in the South, has been precisely that of labor-capital relations.”23 In a general sense, **racial capitalism in the United States constitutes “a peculiar variant of capitalist production” in which Blackness expresses a structural location at the bottom of the labor hierarchy characterized by depressed wages, working conditions, job opportunities, and widespread exclusion from labor unions.24** Furthermore, modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the imbrication of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism. Anti-Blackness describes the reduction of Blackness to a category of abjection and subjection through narrations of absolute biological or cultural difference; ruling-class monopolization of political power; negative and derogatory mass media propaganda; the ascent of discriminatory legislation that maintains and reinscribes inequality, not least various modes of segregation; and social relations in which distrust and antipathy toward those racialized as Black is normalized and in which “interracial mass behavior involving violence assumes a continuously potential danger.”25 Anti-Blackness thus conceals the inherent contradiction of Blackness—value minus worth—obscuring and distorting its structural location by, as Ralph and Singhal remark, contorting it into only a “debilitated condition.”26 **Antiradicalism can be understood as the physical and discursive repression and condemnation of anticapitalist and/or left-leaning ideas, politics, practices, and modes of organizing that are construed as subversive, seditious, and otherwise threatening to capitalist socie**ty. These include, but are not limited to, internationalism, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, peace activism, and antisexism. Anti-Blackness and antiradicalism function as the legitimating architecture of modern U.S. racial capitalism, which includes rationalizing discourses, cultural narratives, technologies of repression, legal structures, and social practices that inform and are informed by racial capitalism’s political economy.27 Throughout the twentieth century, anti-Blackness propelled the “Black Scare,” defined as the specter of racial, social, and economic domination of superior whites by inferior Black populations. Antiradicalism, in turn, was enunciated through the “Red Scare,” understood as the threat of communist takeover, infiltration, and disruption of the American way of life.28 For example, in the 1919 Justice Department Report, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes, As Reflected in Their Publications, it was asserted that the radical antigovernment stance of a certain class of Negroes was manifested in their “ill-governed reaction toward race rioting,” “threat of retaliatory measures in connection with lynching,” open demand for social equality, identification with the International Workers of the World (IWW), and “outspoken advocacy of the Bolshevik or Soviet doctrine.”2 Here, **anti-Blackness, articulated through the fear of the “assertion of race consciousness,”** was attached to the IWW and Bolshevism—in other words, to anticapitalism—to make it appear even more subversive and dangerous. Likewise, antiradicalism, expressed through the denigration of the IWW and Soviet Doctrine, was made to seem all the more threatening and antithetical to the social order in **its linkage with Black insistence on equality and self-defense against racial terrorism.** In this way, “defiance and insolently race-centered condemnation of the white race” and “the Negro seeing red” came to be understood as seditious in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism. The link between my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism and Robinson’s catholic theory of racial capitalism, beyond his “suggest[ion] that it was there,” is vivified through the prison abolitionist and scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who writes: “Capitalism…[is] never not racial.… Racial capitalism: a mode of production developed in agriculture, improved by enclosure in the Old World, and captive land and labor in the Americas, perfected in slavery’s time-motion, field factory choreography, its imperative forged on the anvils of imperial war-making monarchs.”**30 Racial capitalism, she continues, “requires all kinds of scheming, including hard work by elites and their compradors in the overlapping and interlocking space-economies of the planet’s surface. They build and dismantle and reconfigure states, moving capacity into and out of the public realm.** And they think very hard about money on the move.”31 Perhaps more than Gilmore, though, my approach aligns with that of Neville Alexander as described by Hudson.32 Like Alexander, who focused on South Africa, I offer a particularistic understanding of racial capitalism, mine being rooted in the political economy of Blackness and the legitimating architectures of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism in the United States. Gilmore qua Robinson offers a more universalist and transhistorical conception. Like Alexander, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is primarily rooted in (Black) Marxist-Leninists and fellow travelers. This is an important epistemological distinction: whereas Robinson finds Marxism-Leninism to be, at best, inattentive to race, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the work of Black freedom fighters who, as Marxist-Leninists, were able to offer potent and enduring analyses and critiques of the conjunctural entanglements of racialism, white supremacy, and anti-Blackness, on the one hand, and capitalist exploitation and class antagonism on the other hand.33

### 2NC China Revisionism

#### Cooperative, not competitive.

Shrifinson 19 Joshua Shifrinson, International Relations Professor at Boston University. [Should the United States Fear China's Rise? The Washington Quarterly, 41(4), p. 65-83]

This article refines and challenges this emerging policy consensus by placing China’s rise and U.S. decline in the context of other power shifts.5 Not only is it wrong to assume that rising states such as China tend to invariably challenge existing great powers but, relative to what China might be doing, China’s recent assertiveness is far from a clear-cut challenge to the United States. In fact, rising great powers across time and space often (1) support declining great powers to a greater or lesser degree in a bid to obtain their assistance against other threats, and/or (2) limit the scope of their strategic challenge until declining states have fallen far down the great power ranks. Along the way, declining states can affect whether and to what degree rising states pursue a cooperative or competitive course. The key to doing so is not—as policymakers sometimes suggest—simply engaging or deterring rising states directly, but rather manipulating security threats and opportunities rising states face in their own geopolitical environment. Applied to the rise of China and resulting U.S. strategy debate, this framework implies that concerns with a predatory rising China are overblown. Though currently problematic, China is far from issuing an outright challenge to the United States and is likely to continue avoiding such a course for some time. As importantly, current and future developments in China’s strategic environment may help push the PRC toward greater cooperation with the United States. To catalyze and capitalize on such possibilities, however, U.S. strategists themselves need to recognize that an overly assertive response to China’s rise—one that foregrounds U.S. threats, asserts U.S. power in and around East Asia, and forecloses the possibility of U.S.-China cooperation—is counterproductive. Under certain conditions, a less activist American foreign policy may do more than most pundits expect to encourage Chinese cooperation.

#### Diplomacy, internationalism, globalization mean no chance of war.

Thorton '22 - Senior Fellow at the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School [Susan, March/April, "A Rival of America’s Making? The Debate Over Washington’s China Strategy," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-02-11/china-strategy-rival-americas-making]

John Mearsheimer’s article engenders a sense of foreboding and doom. “Engagement may have been the worst strategic blunder any country has made in recent history,” he writes. As a result, “China and the United States are locked in what can only be called a new cold war. . . . And this cold war is more likely to turn hot.”

I cannot agree that the U.S. policy of engaging China was a major strategic blunder. During the Cold War, that policy succeeded at convincing China to stop sponsoring communist revolutions in East Asia and helped counter the Soviet Union. After the Cold War ended, engagement enabled massive economic growth in China that lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty—a significant reason that the share of people worldwide living in extreme poverty, by the World Bank’s definition, fell from 36 percent in 1990 to 12 percent in 2015. Surely, this counts as a major human achievement.

What would be a strategic blunder, however, is whatever series of missteps might lead to a military conflict between China and the United States. Mearsheimer argues that structural factors are inexorably leading to such a conflict. But his realist view of the situation disregards modern international realities.

There are a number of formidable restraints in place to keep the peace. The United States has worked hard over the decades to build these barriers—often as part of the very engagement strategy that Mearsheimer criticizes. These bulwarks have helped preserve peace and promote prosperity for the last 70 years, and they are still strong enough to prevent a U.S.-Chinese conflict. Although accidents or incidents connected to military brinkmanship may occur, they would almost certainly not lead to a wider war. That would require something exceedingly unlikely: the simultaneous failure of every restraint.

First, bilateral diplomacy would have to break down. Engagement is the opposite of estrangement, which describes the absence of U.S.-Chinese relations from 1949 to 1972. The purpose of engagement is to forestall misperceptions, provide reassurance, and prevent conflict. It is true that diplomacy and communication between China and the United States have been anemic for the past five years. And it is difficult to discern authoritative policy amid the current cacophony of diplomatic posturing on Twitter and elsewhere, creating an environment ripe for confusion and overreaction. But these deficiencies are not structural; they can be remedied. If top-level leaders in both countries consistently communicate and work to reduce public posturing, as they should, then the diplomatic barriers to war can be reinforced.

For a war to break out, the international system would also have to fail. China and the United States are connected to a global network of countries and institutions that have a stake—in some cases, an existential stake—in preventing conflict between these two countries. Almost every government and institution on the globe would be grievously damaged by a U.S.-Chinese war, and so they all would try to prevent an imminent conflict through diplomatic pressure, mediation, or acts of resistance, such as denying overflight and basing rights. Critics may be quick to deny the influence of others in heading off a major-power clash. But in the current international system, there is no way for either side to emerge victorious, and those outside China and the United States would see this most clearly.

Then there is the restraint created by globalization. Mearsheimer argues that it was a catastrophic mistake for the United States to help China grow wealthy, as its resulting strength will inevitably lead it to challenge the United States. But it is also plausible that the inextricably integrated nature of the global economy, and specifically of the Chinese and U.S. economies, makes any war unwinnable and thus acts as a deterrent to conflict. It is true, as critics will point out, that economic dependencies failed to prevent World War I. But the economic relations of the early twentieth century were nothing like the complex entanglements of today’s international economic system. In the case of China and the United States, they create a situation of mutual assured economic destruction.